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INTRODUCTION
Can insights drawn from behavioral economics point to
inherent failures in the market for consumer contracts and explain
their origins? The underlying thesis of this Article is that
behavioral economics should have a central role in demonstrating
and understanding the inadequacies of current approaches to
consumer standard form contracts ("SFCs") and in forming the law
that should govern them.
Contracts are binding promises' that result in legal
relationships.2 Contracts play a central role in people's legal
experiences and interactions with one another. Many of our most
important personal and everyday relationships involve contracts or
are governed by them.3
The most pervasive kind of contract is the consumer standard
form contract. Consumer contracts account for the vast majority of
everyday transactions between firms (as sellers) and consumers (as
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) ("A contract is a
promise or a set of promises .... ").
2. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(12) (2001) ("'Contract' . . . means the total legal
obligation that results from the parties' agreement as determined by [the
Uniform Commercial Code] as supplemented by any other applicable laws.").
3. See, e.g., Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J.
1417, 1419 (2004).
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buyers).4 The ubiquity of consumer SFCs cannot be exaggerated.
One enters an SFC by opening a bank account, purchasing
software on the web, renting a safe deposit box in a bank, or
engaging in countless other day-to-day activities. This Article sets
its focus on this kind of contract.
However omnipresent, SFCs depart from the classic paradigm
of contract law in various conspicuous ways, and some of these
departures are assumed to pose serious challenges to traditional
analysis of contract law. SFCs are not a result of a negotiation
process: they are offered on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis; they do
not require a "meeting of the minds"; and they are rarely read by
the promisee (i.e., the consumer). In most instances, therefore,
SFCs reflect sellers' informational advantage over consumers
("obligational asymmetric information"). In turn, consumers who
are misinformed about the SFCs they enter might accept poor
deals.5
Although the departures and problems associated with SFCs
are well recognized, many decades of controversy have failed to
produce a satisfying (let alone accepted) approach as to the proper
legal treatment of consumer contracts. 6 This Article argues that a
considerable part of this failure is due to the fact that important and
relevant social science insights regarding consumers' behavior are
widely overlooked.
4. See, e.g., W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic
Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARv. L. REv. 529, 530 (1971).
5. One could say, in other words, that an unread biased contract is a hidden
defect in a product.
6. In light of these departures, scholars have proposed a number of ways to
deal with consumer SFCs. These proposals can be categorized into three
groups. One group focuses on providing the judiciary with the necessary tools
and discretion to intervene, ex post, in appropriate SFC cases. The second group
seeks to advance legislation that will protect consumers, mainly by requiring
information disclosure and assuring fair or efficient contracting practices. Yet a
third group seeks to minimize legal intervention in the market for consumer
contract terms, arguing that market forces can lead to an efficient equilibrium
where sellers have a sufficient profit-incentive to draft efficient SFCs. For
further discussion, see Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer
Contracts: The Challenge That Is Yet to be Met, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. (forthcoming
2008).
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Much of contract law assumes that people know what they
want and thus are the best judges of their own utility.
Nonetheless, the application of behavioral economics insights to
consumer contracts calls this fundamental notion into question.
Given the cognitive limitations of ordinary people, consumers as a
class frequently violate the rational-maximizing-expected-utility
function that contract law theory ordinarily attributes to contracting
parties. In other words, presuming the efficiency of form contract
terms might be misguided due to fundamental behavioral failures
on the part of consumers.
The social science literature dealing with consumers' decision
making is relatively well developed. There is, nonetheless, a
serious gap in the legal application of this literature addressing
SFCs. One of the troubling consequences of this gap is the
prevalence of unfair and inefficient SFC provisions. More
profoundly, this gap in legal understanding means that current
approaches to SFCs are fundamentally flawed and bound to result
in erratic and sometimes unjust conclusions.
Therefore, the underlying theme of this Article is that cognitive
biases and consumers' actual behavioral patterns have central
roles-both descriptively and normatively-in the law of SFCs.
This Article explains how psychological phenomena contribute (i)
to consumers' tendency not to read SFCs even when by doing so
they fail to maximize their utility; (ii) to consumers' inability to
correctly evaluate contract terms once they do read them; and (iii)
to sellers' ability to manipulate consumers.
The contribution of this discussion is twofold: First, this Article
expands our understanding regarding the inadequacies of current
approaches to SFCs and the harm that consumers are exposed to
when actual behavioral patterns are ignored. Second, this Article
suggests valuable insights into the ways in which the design issues
associated with the alternative proposed solution ought to be
approached. However, it should be clear that this Article remains
silent with respect to the challenge of portraying in detail a
7. This fundamental presumption is based both on the rationality
assumption that accompanies economic analysis of law and on respect for
individuals' autonomy.
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superior mechanism aimed at dealing with SFCs. This design
issue is a completely distinct project, which I address separately. 8
The behavioral phenomena discussed in this Article are mainly
based on behavioral economics models. 9 These models are an
important tool in understanding some of the limits of economics
and its ability to predict human behavior. Part I of this Article
presents a brief explanation of these models and their general
application to law.
Thereafter, this Article presents four specific behavioral
patterns, each of which is particularly relevant to standard form
contracting practices. The first is that buyers usually face SFCs
only at the very end of a lengthy shopping process. The general
assertion in this context is that at this late stage consumers are
unlikely to ascribe to contract terms the full meaning or importance
they deserve. This is the focus of Part II, where psychological
phenomena such as the sunk cost effect, cognitive dissonance, the
confirmation bias, and the low-ball technique are applied.
Second, empirical evidence supports the assertion that people
have limited ability to rationally evaluate prospects of future
contingencies and risks. Part III links this general failure to some
typical clauses frequently incorporated in SFCs. Individuals'
inability to accurately evaluate low probabilities, the availability
cascade, and the prevalence of self-serving biases such as
overoptimism and over-confidence serve as important starting
points in this discussion.
The third behavioral pattern results from the environment that
typically accompanies the offer and acceptance of consumer
contracts. In many instances consumers sign (or otherwise enter
into) SFCs under unfavorable circumstances. This prevents
consumers from engaging in reasonable, let alone optimal,
deliberation. The analysis of the behavioral effects of pressure and
the attendant emotional stress as they relate to SFCs stands at the
heart of Part IV.
8. See Shmuel I. Becher, A "Fair Contracts" Approval Mechanism:
Reconciling Consumer Contracts and Conventional Contract Law (Sept. 20,
2007) (work in progress), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=- 10 15736.
9. Parts II, III, and V are based on behavioral economics models and
studies. As detailed below, Part IV employs insights from different yet related
disciplines.
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The last behavioral failure addressed in this Article is the
phenomenon dubbed "information overload." Generally speaking,
individuals' limited ability to process information undermines
optimal contracting. Part V critically evaluates the different
approaches to the relevancy of information overload,
demonstrating how and why it can negatively affect the likelihood
of efficient terms arising in SFCs.
I. A BRIEF PREFACE TO BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS
For many years, law and economics has been-and clearly still
is--one of the most influential and dominant prisms through which
law is scrutinized, explored, and studied.' 0 Law and economics is
a particularly powerful tool since it relies on a theory that aspires
to elegantly predict human behavior and responses to incentives
that the law can create and offer." The behavioral theory behind
law and economics is the longstanding economics model of
rational choice theory, which has expanded beyond its original
field. 1
2
10. Undoubtedly, both proponents and opponents of law and economics
share this view. A very few examples are RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 23-26 (7th ed. 2007) (briefly reviewing the history of the
economic approach to law and emphasizing the positive and normative scope of
economic analysis); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment
and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1499, 1500 (1998); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law
After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829 (2003) (arguing
that economic approach to contract law does not explain current doctrines and
does not provide a sound basis for criticizing and reforming current contract
law, but that it played a dominant role in contracts scholarship during the
1990s).
11. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88
CAL. L. REv. 1051, 1054-55 (2000).
12. See, e.g., Thomas Gilovich & Dale Griffin, Heuristics and Biases: Now
and Then, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT 1 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002)
[hereinafter HEURISTICS AND BIASES].
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Law and economics has been challenged from various
perspectives. 13 One repeated criticism is that traditional law and
economics relies on some simplifying assumptions about human
behavior and human decision making process which are neither
accurate nor valid in many situations. According to this line of
argument, people deviate, in systematic ways, from what is
supposed (by standards of efficiency) to be rational behavior.14
Behavioral law and economics scholars postulate the idea that
human deviation from rationality should not be limited and
narrowed to economic market failures. According to behavioral
law and economics proponents, there are many other
circumstances where people deviate, in a systematic and
predictable way, from what is expected by economics to be a
rational behavior. Slightly restated, behavioral academics argue
that rational-choice theory neglects to acknowledge some
important aspects of human behavior.' 5  Overlooking those
aspects, the argument goes, can lead to erroneous predictions that
should not be a part of the process of formulating legal policy.
In past years there has been increasing interest in bringing
together, into a coherent theory, insights drawn from new models
of human behavior and decision making.' 6  Some of these
behavioral models rely on psychological theories, while others are
grounded on what is known as behavioral economics. These
models, which have been long applied in other fields of economics
13. Early skeptical approaches which rely, inter alia, on psychology and
other social sciences are, for example, Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory,
Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669
(1979) and Arthur Allen Leff, Economics Analysis of Law: Some Realism About
Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974). For a brief review of general criticism
of the economic approach to law, see POSNER, supra note 10, at 26-27.
14. For a survey of some of the literature that documents those departures,
see, for example, Langevoort, supra note 10. For a similar general statement
see, for example, Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 11, at 1055.
15. See, e.g., Jeffery J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A
Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739,
765 (2000).
16. See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 11, at 1057; Langevoort, supra
note 10, at 1502. One prominent example is BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS
(Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
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and are now being applied to law, 17 aim to present competing
behavioral models different from the ones employed by the
neoclassical law and economics theory.
18
In spite of the fact that this relatively new legal field-which is
frequently termed "behavioral law and economics" 9--challenges
the traditional law and economics approach, it also accepts some of
its basic methodologies. One such accepted premise is important
to note here: behavioral economics readily adopts the assumption
that peoples' behavior does not only systematically deviate from
rationality, but that many of these deviations are predictable and
thus should be modeled.20  Following this fundamental
understanding, the main task of behavioral law and economics is to
create a framework that better explores, and thus better predicts,
actual human behavior and its implications for different bodies of
law.2 1 I now turn to examine and apply the relevant behavioral
insights in relation to consumer SFCs.
17. For an argument that there is a sharp gap in the application of these
competing models between law on one hand and other economic fields on the
other, see, for example, Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473
(1998).
18. In many instances, these competing models differ from the classical
economic ones since they focus on the concern that "[i]f people make systematic
errors in judgment, then they will make bad choices even when they have the
incentives and information needed to make good ones, and hence, do themselves
harm if left to their own devices." Jeffery J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain
Psychological Casefor Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1165, 1166 (2003).
19. Scholars have been using different terms when referring to this field.
The term "Behavioral Law and Economics" has been used, for instance, by Jolls
et al., supra note 17, and Langevoort, supra note 10. For other terms, see, for
example, Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 11 ("Law and Behavioral Science") and
Rachlinski, supra note 15 ("Law and Psychology"). I use these terms
interchangeably.
20. See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 17, at 1474 ("The unifying idea in our
analysis is that behavioral economics allows us to model and predict behavior
relevant to law with the tools of traditional economics analysis, but with more
accurate assumptions about human behavior . . . ."); Cass R. Sunstein,
Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 16, at 1 (arguing
that people's behavior, though not "rational" in the way that economists intend,
"can be described, used and sometimes even modeled").
21. See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 17, at 1476; Korobkin & Ulen, supra
note 11, at 1058; Rachlinski, supra note 15.
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II. PERCEPTION OF SELF COMMITMENT
Contract law assumes that contracts are drafted or negotiated
by both contracting parties. Yet, one of the distinct characteristics
of consumer contracting is that sellers usually present their
contracts for consumers' acceptance at the end of a shopping
process, when buyers have actually made up their minds to enter
the transaction at issue. Consumers who wish to acquire
information regarding the transaction at stake are very likely to do
so before sellers present their contracts. By constructing the
process this way, sellers can increase the chances that consumers
will not carefully examine the contract they enter. At this late
stage of the shopping process, behavioral patterns might prevent
consumers from engaging in significant comparison shopping.
This part argues that common psychological phenomena--the
sunk cost effect, the cognitive dissonance theory, the confirmation
bias, and the low-ball technique-can contribute substantially to
consumers' unwillingness to efficiently process information
incorporated in an SFC. In addition, the analysis below
demonstrates that those biases can have an important role in
drafting specific SFC terms and in regulating consumer
transactions. All these arguments will be addressed in turn in the
next sections.
A. The Sunk Cost Effect
Utility maximization assumes that individuals have a stable set
of preferences not influenced by irrelevant factors. One possible
irrelevant factor, in this respect, is past investments. Economists
use the term "sunk cost" to refer to preceding investments which
cannot affect the expected marginal utility from future activities or
decisions. Since sunk costs are not recoverable through
subsequent action, conventional analysis expects decisionmakers
to maximize their utility by ignoring such irrelevant costs.
22
22. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 10, at 7 ("Rational people base their
decisions on their expectations of the future rather than on their regrets about the
past."); RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART MYRES, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 115 (5th ed. 1996) (articulating the famous phrase: "Sunk cost are like
spilt milk: they are past and irreversible outflows."); William Samuelson &
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Accordingly, rational individuals are expected to base their
decisions solely on the costs and benefits from the moment they
make their decision and forward.23
Since rational decisions should be based on incremental costs
and benefits, rational consumers ought to read (or ignore) SFCs
purely on the basis of the expected utility that reading (or ignoring)
entails. This is to say, the resources invested by a consumer during
her shopping process prior to entering a contract should be deemed
irrelevant sunk costs when assessing the expected value of reading
(or ignoring) the SFC she enters.
Behavioral economics proponents challenge the fundamental
prediction according to which sunk costs should not--or do not-
matter. Although conventional economics expects individuals to
ignore sunk costs, empirical studies demonstrate that sunk costs do
matter and influence decisionmakers' behavior. 24 To describe this
phenomenon, behavioral economics scholars use the term "sunk
cost effect. 25  The sunk cost effect, as this argument goes, "is
manifested in a greater tendency to continue an endeavor once an
Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 7, 37 (1988) ("One of the earliest lessons in economics is that
decisions should be based on incremental benefits and costs.").
23. A more intuitive way to put it, however, is that "[a] person should not
stop at the gym on the way home from work merely because he has paid a hefty
annual membership fee; he should stop only if he expects that the utility derived
from a workout will exceed the utility derived from getting home earlier."
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 11, at 1124.
24. See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 17, at 1482-83, nn.25-28, 1490-92
(discussing the theater patron study and the ultimatum game and its sunk-cost
variation); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 11, at 1073-74 (noting the ample
evidence demonstrating that many people attend a performance once they have
paid for a ticket, reasoning that otherwise it is a waste of money); id. at 1124
("Notwithstanding economic wisdom to the contrary, people routinely cite sunk
costs as a reason for pursuing a particular course of action."); Hillary A. Sale,
Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 903, 919 (2002) ("People facing
high-risk situations, are more likely to gamble on a risky outcome than to accept
the loss upfront. 'Rational' or not, their commitment to the situations escalates,
sunk costs dominate, and the ability to pull back and reexamine the situation is
diminished.").
25. See Richard Thaler, Towards a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 47 (1980).
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investment in money, effort, or time has been made." 26 Moreover,
it is predicted that "the larger the past resource investment in a
decision, the greater the inclination to continue the commitment in
subsequent decision." 27  Allowing sunk costs to influence one's
decision making violates the traditional economical principle that
presumes individuals will choose among competing options
regardless of the ways in which these options are framed.
To understand this behavioral pattern and its implication to the
law of SFCs, it is important to clarify why people allow sunk costs
to influence their decisions. The main explanation is based on
motivational grounds-that the sunk cost effect can be best
justified as a self-esteem maintenance device.2 8 People might feel
compelled to maintain a past-chosen course of action as a means of
preserving some aspects of self-perception. Hence, the sunk cost
effect is predicted, in part, because of people's aspiration to not
be--or appear-wasteful.29
26. Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35
ORG. BEHAV. & HuM. DECISION PROCESS 124 (1985) (presenting a study of
theater patrons that revealed that those who were randomly assigned discounted
tickets attended significantly fewer performances).
27. Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 22, at 37. Probably the most
famous and common examples are those of large public projects. See, e.g.,
Arkes & Blumer, supra note 26, at 124 (citing Senator Denton: "To terminate a
project in which $1.1 billion has been invested represents an unconscionable
mishandling of taxpayers' dollars," and Senator Sasser: "Terminating the
[Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway] project at this late stage of development
would... represent a serious waste of funds already invested.").
28. For modeling sunk cost and grounding it on prospect theory, see Thaler,
supra note 25, at 48-49. According to Thaler's modeling, the sunk cost effect
can be explained by referring to the "pain" (which corresponds to the value
function in the domain of loss) that a consumer suffers from the loss of past
investments. Id. That modeling also explains why the more resources one
invests, the more likely he is to display a sunk costs effect.
29. Arkes & Blumer, supra note 26, at 132 ("One reason why people may
wish to throw good money after bad is that to stop investing would constitute an
admission that the prior money was wasted. The admission that one has wasted
money would seem to be an aversive event. The admission can be avoided by
continuing to act as if the prior spending was sensible, and a good way to foster
that belief would be to invest more.").
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Behavioral law and economics scholars frequently adopt this
line of reasoning, emphasizing the notion of consistency. In this
respect, changing a prior course of action might simply imply that
the preceding decision was a mistake. Furthermore, overcoming
the sunk cost effect is likely to be an extremely challenging task,
which most people cannot undertake successfully. At times, this is
true even for sophisticated parties that have been trained and
instructed to ignore behavioral biases.
3
'
The sunk cost effect is ubiquitous for numerous monetary and
non-monetary investments.32 The idea of a "sunk cost effect" has
been applied by behavioral law and economics scholars in a
number of different contexts. 33  Surprisingly enough, however,
there is almost no application to the field of consumer SFCs.3 4
30. See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 11, at 1125 ("People often pay
heed to sunk cost because they want to act consistently. And while the desire
for consistency can be foolish in the face of changed circumstances, it can also
be quite sensible when our past actions are based on reliable evaluations of costs
and benefits." (footnotes omitted) (citing ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE:
SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 50-93 (3d ed. 1993)); Donald C. Langevoort, Ego,
Human Behavior, and Law, 51 VA. L. REv. 853 (1995).
31. See, e.g., Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas,
1999 UTAH L. REv. 205, 214 (1999) ("[T]his theory [that people hate certain
losses] helps explain why otherwise rational business people will commit money
to keep a venture alive that has lost them a great deal in the past, when new
investors are reluctant to invest."); Mark Seidenfeld, Symposium: Getting
Beyond Cynicism: New Theories of the Regulatory State Cognitive Loading,
Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L.
REv. 486, 500, 517 (2002) (revealing experiments that demonstrate that even
experts who are aware of maximizing rules such as ignoring sunk cost may fail
to utilize them).
32. See Arkes & Blumer, supra note 26, at 139 (concluding that "the sunk
cost effect is a robust judgment error").
33. One prominent example is the stage in which individuals face a decision
whether to settle a case or to litigate it in court. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff &
George Lowenstein, Second Thoughts About Summery Judgment, 100 YALE L.J.
73, 113-14 (1990) (claiming that procedural mechanisms aimed at increasing
up-front information sharing and evaluation may not have the desired pro-
settlement effect due to, inter alia, the sunk cost effect phenomenon); Russell
Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New
Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REv. 77, 131-32 (1997).
34. For one exception, see Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and
Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L.
REv. 215, 289-90 (1990). Katz argues that buyers prefer not to read SFCs since
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This Article takes the position that the sunk cost effect plays an
important role in consumers' decisions not to read SFCs. Since the
efforts to become familiar with the transaction's details are sunk, a
natural tendency, according to the framework proposed by
behavioral law and economics, is to ignore potentially adverse
terms that the SFC may contain, although this tendency is
irrational according to traditional law and economics. Once a
consumer has spent substantial time and effort deciding to
purchase a specific good, she will seek to economize on these
efforts and go ahead with the transaction at stake, regardless of the
content of the SFC she accepts.
Since the sunk cost effect exists in conjunction with the amount
of resources previously invested, its effect varies substantially
among different kinds of transactions. Certainly, shopping efforts
diverge significantly for different kinds of markets and products.
Yet, as a general argument, in most cases vendors present their
SFC only after the shopping process has actually ended. Since the
consumer is likely to spend a considerable amount of time in order
to become acquainted with the good or service she is about to
purchase before the SFC is presented, the sunk cost effect may
contribute to her decision to ignore the accompanying contract.
However, the sunk cost effect might prove too much if it is
understood as a plain argument in favor of invalidating SFCs or
negating consumers' acceptance of them. This is definitely not
what the argument seeks to establish, especially since it seems
unlikely that buyers and sellers will discuss all contractual terms at
they know that once they do read standardized terms they incur sunk costs
which may induce them to enter a "barely acceptable deal." In my opinion,
however, Katz's application is fairly partial since it addresses sunk costs only
with respect to reading a contract, rather than placing the phenomenon of sunk
costs in the broader contexts of consumer search and behavior. Second, Katz's
analysis seems not to distinguish between sunk costs and cognitive dissonance.
See infra Part II.B. Third, the assertion that consumers will avoid reading SFCs
in order not to accumulate sunk costs, which might distort rational decisions,
seems to attribute ordinary consumers with far too much rationality.
For another exception, see source cited infra note 56 and accompanying text.
This application, as will be explained infra Part II.E, differs substantially from
the one expressed here since it is tailored to a specific kind of contractual term
(i.e., periodic payments).
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the very beginning of the shopping process. However, it is
necessary to acknowledge that sunk cost is an important factor in
standard form contracting. Hence, in some cases the sunk cost
effect should be considered against the assumption that buyers
enter SFCs after having had the opportunity to rationally inspect
their content. This is particularly true in those cases where buyers
incur substantial sunk costs or where sellers manipulate the
transaction so as to exploit the sunk cost effect.
The rolling contract paradigm can serve as a good illustration.
Nowadays, many consumers use the intemet for purchasing
products and services. 35  In the e-commerce context, it is very
common for consumers to read or obtain the relevant contract
terms only after purchasing (and at times, receiving) the purchased
item.36 Obviously, at this stage consumers are likely to complete
their shopping process, incurring substantial sunk costs.
Moreover, at this late stage it may be costly for a consumer to
change his mind and return the product, since getting rid of it
requires some additional investment and effort.37
The rolling contracts paradigm demonstrates how relevant the
sunk cost effect can be in modem consumer markets. Where the
transaction is structured in a way that allows consumers to inspect
the contract only at a very late stage, it is problematic to assume
consumers are making rational decisions in accepting SFCs.
Thus, the sunk cost effect might foster suboptimal decision
making and increase inefficient and unfair contracting. Sellers
aware of the fact that sunk cost is so frequently hard to ignore can
35. For instance, it is reported that for the year 2006, total consumer online
spending reached $170 billion. Online Consumer Spending to Hit $170 Billion
in 2006, METRICS 2.0, Oct. 26, 2006, http://www.metrics2.com/blog/2006/
10/26/onlineconsumer spending tohit170billion in200.html (last visited
July 8, 2007).
36. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REv.
743, 744 (2002) ("In a rolling contract, a consumer orders and pays for goods
before seeing most of the terms, which are contained on or in the packaging of
the goods. Upon receipt, the buyer enjoys the right to return the goods for a
limited period of time." (citing Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148
(7th Cir. 1997)).
37. For instance, a consumer who wants to return a product might need to
go to the post office in order to ship it back or to call the seller and explain why
he is not interested in the product.
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utilize this phenomenon. For example, sellers can manipulate the
contracting process in a way that exploits consumers' behavioral
failures and tendencies by hiding their contracts inside products'
packages, by intentionally postponing the discussion about
contractual terms, or by presenting the SFC at the latest possible
stage.
B. Cognitive Dissonance
A related way to analyze consumers' self commitment to
transactions that involve SFCs is by invoking the cognitive
dissonance theory. This theory suggests that people are reluctant
to hold conflicting ideas simultaneously. Such reluctance can lead
people to devalue evidence that undermines their choices ex post.
At the same time, cognitive dissonance also suggests that people
will adjust their beliefs in order to justify their previously made
choices and preferences (thus revaluing previous choices upwards
so they appear more beneficial).38
As noted, in many (if not most) instances consumers decide,
consciously or not, to enter a transaction before being confronted
with an SFC. If an SFC is introduced when the purchaser has
already decided to enter a transaction, cognitive dissonance may
prevent him from rationally evaluating the contract terms he finds
in the pre-drafted form. Where the contract terms he encounters
undermine the utility he hopes to derive from the transaction at
issue, cognitive dissonance may preclude efficient evaluation.
Moreover, the natural human desire to avoid cognitive dissonance
might imply that consumers are likely to prefer, consciously or not,
not to read the form contract and realize that they may be about to
enter into a poor contract, knowing that they are probably going
ahead with the transaction anyway. 9 As before, the option of not
realizing the terms of the contract one enters is quite exceptional
38. See ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 178-79 (7th ed. 1995)
(defining cognitive dissonance as "a state of tension that occurs whenever an
individual simultaneously holds two cognitions (ideas, attitudes, beliefs,
opinions) that are psychologically inconsistent," where the tension can be
reduced "by changing one or both cognitions in such a way as to render them
more compatible (more consonant) with each other").
39. See Katz, supra note 34, at 288-89.
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(though not exclusive) to the context of SFCs. In most other
contracts both contracting parties take an active role in the
contract's formation.
C. The Confirmation Bias
The sunk costs effect and the cognitive dissonance
phenomenon can be related, in part, to another psychological
observation: the confirmation bias. According to this bias,
individuals who form an opinion appear to search for data that
supports and confirms their existing opinion rather than
information that might challenge or contradict it.40 Once again,
empirical experiments support the assertion that it may be difficult
to eliminate this bias.4'
Therefore, if a consumer has formed an opinion about a service
or product and has reached a (preliminary) decision to enter a
specific transaction since he believes it would be beneficial to do
so, he is more likely to search for reinforcing indications to
buttress this decision. Assuming that most consumers do not
expect to find positive signals (to further denote that the
transaction they are about to enter is a favorable one) integrated in
SFCs, the confirmation bias might prevent them from reading such
contracts in the first place.
No less importantly, the confirmation bias can explain why
those consumers who do read SFCs are not likely to evaluate their
content rationally. According to the confirmation bias, people
predictably not only search for information that reinforces their
previous belief, but also process information they encounter in a
way that strengthens their already existing viewpoints.42 Given
40. See, e.g., SCoTr PLous, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION
MAKING 233 (1993) ("[The confirmation bias] usually refers to a preference for
information that is consistent with a hypothesis rather than information that
opposes it.").
41. Seeid at 238-39.
42. See ARTHUR S. REBER, THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 151
(2d ed. 1995) (defining confirmation bias as "the tendency to seek and interpret
information that confirms existing beliefs" (emphasis added)).
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this aspect of the confirmation bias, even if consumers read SFCs
they should not be expected to evaluate them objectively. 43
D. The Low-Ball Technique
The last relevant phenomenon to note in this context of past
investment and perceptions of self-commitment is the low-ball
technique. Basically, the low-ball technique is a procedure in
which an agent is underestimating or understating a price. For
example, a typical case of the low-ball technique occurs where
salesmen (or advertisements) get a subject to agree (or to consider)
to purchase an item at a discounted price. Later on, the discount is
removed, but the initial decision to enter the transaction can lead
the subject to assent to the new (yet higher) price. 4
Perhaps a few practical examples can be useful. In e-
commerce, for instance, it is not uncommon to find a seller stating,
up front, the total price of a given product. Yet, when the
consumer is about to enter the deal and pay for the product, he is
being requested to pay for additional hidden charges (such as
"shipping and handling," an "online service fee," a "general
membership fee," etc.).
This technique is also used where consumers purchase services
or products that are continuous in their nature. A prominent
example is an introductory rate 45-a technique repeatedly
employed by sellers to tempt potential clients to purchase long-
43. Hillman and Rachlinski use the term "motivated reasoning" to illustrate
this idea. See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffery J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form
Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 453 (2002)
("Because consumers usually encounter standard terms after they have decided
to purchase the good or service, they will process the terms in the boilerplate in
a way that supports their desire to complete the transaction.").
44. A harsh version of this technique is the notorious "bait-and-switch"
selling tactic. The FTC considers "bait-and-switch" as a family of practices
where an initial ad offers an especially tempting price on a certain model as
"bait" to attract consumers. Thereafter, sales staff commences to "switch" the
purchases to other items, usually at a higher price. The FTC has declared this
technique as deceptive and therefore unlawful. See 16 C.F.R. § 238 (2003).
45. The term "teaser rate" is used in the context of mortgage and credit card
agreements to describe a very low-yet very temporary-introductory rate.
This "teaser rate" practice can be viewed, in a way, as a low-ball technique.
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term services such as internet or telephone.46 In such cases,
consumers are more likely to assent to the amended price than they
would have been had the seller stated the actual price from the very
beginning. Accordingly, subjects that are exposed to the low-ball
technique may enter a transaction even though the true, long-term
price can no longer be considered a "good deal";47 or, using the
economists' terminology, it does not maximize the subject's utility.
A good illustration of the low-ball technique is found in the
famous contract case of Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.48 In this
case, Hoffman, a prospective franchisee, was confronted with a
series of increasingly burdensome franchise conditions, gradually
raising the franchise's price. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court
described:
The record here discloses a number of promises and
assurances given to Hoffmnan . . . . Foremost were the
promises that for the sum of $18,000 Red Owl would
establish Hoffman in a store. After Hoffman had sold his
grocery store and paid the $1,000 on the Chilton lot, the
$18,000 figure was changed to 24,100. Then... Hoffman
was assured that if the $24,100 were increased by $2,000
the deal would go through.49
This case and the question it presents with respect to contract-
like liability in pre-contractual negotiations have been discussed at
length.50 Although there are a number of ways to approach this
case, the low-ball technique and the sunk cost effect provide an
additional angle and a more subtle explanation as to why the court
showed sympathy to, and ruled in favor of, Hoffman.
When giving this selling tactic another thought, it should be
apparent that the underlying idea of the low-ball technique is
relevant to many consumer markets. During the course of market
shopping and negotiation, it is very common for salesmen to
46. This second type of low-ball technique is related to people's propensity
to focus on current consumption. See infra Part III.D.
47. See, e.g., Arkes and Blumer, supra note 26, at 138.
48. 133 N.W.2d 267, 274 (1965).
49. Id.
50. See Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, Promissory Fraud Without Breach,
2004 WIs. L. REv. 507, 515-17 (2004) and accompanying notes.
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clarify to consumers what their legal rights are, what the sellers'
responsibilities are, and what the products' or services'
characteristics are. Moreover, many products and services are
advertised. Advertisements form consumers' expectations about
their legal rights, the promised results of using a given product, the
risks associated with a product, and the like.
Yet, SFCs that accompany any given transaction might not
completely correlate with what has been previously stated or
otherwise promised. Some positive transactional attributes (from
consumers' perspective) that have been emphasized or promised
are sometimes not (fully) incorporated into pre-drafted SFCs. The
gap between what was promised or stated on one hand, and what is
actually agreed upon in the contract's four corners on the other,
resembles the low-ball technique.
5
'
As noted, the rationale for employing this technique is that an
otherwise unlikely investment is more likely due to one's prior
decision to commit. Using the low-ball technique, salesmen can
induce buyers to go ahead and sign SFCs that the buyers would not
enter had they fully realized the terms and substance beforehand.52
This is true because a consumer's prior decision to agree to a
specific set of terms is based on what was orally promised or
otherwise advertised. Consequently, consumers' preliminary
commitment might result in a greater tendency to enter SFCs while
ignoring--or devaluing-what is actually incorporated in print and
imposed in practice.
51. Interestingly, the drafters of the U.C.C. were aware of this problem (at
least in part). U.C.C. section 2-209 requires that contractual terms that bar oral
modification should be separately signed. U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (2001).
52. However, this is not the only technique that sellers use when referring to
the gap between what SFC terms state and what has been previously stated or
promised. At times, and as supplementary measures, sellers ask customers to
trust them or to ignore the "legal gobbledygook" in the SFC. Additionally,
sellers might undermine the importance of the written contract and the prospects
that it will be used against the customer. Finally, sellers might err (or exploit
consumers' lack of legal expertise) and interpret or explain SFC terms
incorrectly.
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E. Specific Contract Terms
The discussion thus far shows that specific behavioral patterns
prevent consumers from reading SFCs or rationally evaluating
their substance. This section further discusses two potential ways
in which the formation of specific SFC terms might advance the
exploitation of these behaviors. The first method of exploitation is
to premise the transaction on periodic payments; the second
method is to use unilateral modification clauses.
1. Rent-to-Own Transactions and Periodic Payments Terms
Many consumer goods can be purchased through credit
transactions. Some of these transactions are based on periodic
payments. Sellers of consumer goods frequently construct their
SFCs so that buyers are obligated to make periodic payments.
53
Even though consumers may have the contractual right to stop the
payments and return the merchandise, the sunk cost effect can
prevent them from discontinuing paying. According to Korobkin
and Ulen, such deals are often attempts to take advantage of
people's propensity to commit to a course of action once they have
incurred sunk costs.
54
People's commitment to sunk cost and the use of contractual
terms to secure this commitment is particularly evident in "rent-to-
own" deals. In typical rent-to-own transactions, a consumer agrees
to rent a product for one week or one month at a time. In contrast
to regular rental and monthly payment deals, in a rent-to-own
transaction, the consumer does not have a contractual obligation to
continue paying for the entire life of the loan. It is also common in
such arrangements for sellers to take upon themselves the
obligations to repair and maintain the product as long as it is
rented.
Most importantly to the present context, in rent-to-own
transactions the consumer is given the option of purchasing the
53. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 11, at 1126.
54. Id. Accordingly, they propose that "[t]o the extent that lawmakers
believe that such contracts result in many consumers' failing to maximize their
utility, those lawmakers might consider implementing restrictions on the way
consumer contracts may be structured." Id.
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rented item. Once a consumer decides to buy the rented
merchandise, past rent payments, at least to some extent,55 can be
applied towards ownership. Alternatively, a consumer may
become the owner of the rented product once he completes a given
period of rent, commonly 18 months. At times, the consumer will
be required to pay an additional fee for becoming the owner.
Consumers enter rent-to-own transactions for various reasons.
One common reason is insufficient funds for making a regular
purchase. Another reason may be bad credit. Whereas these
reasons might lead to an informed preference (that is, a result of a
reasonable deliberation) to enter such transactions, consumers also
enter rent-to-own agreements for less "rational" reasons.
For instance, sellers tempt buyers to enter rent-to-own
transactions by presenting them as risk-free transactions, as
opportunities to experience the products without making a long-
term commitment, and by emphasizing the option of making
flexible payments. Such deals, which usually require consumers to
pay a great deal more than the regular cash price for the rented
56 5item, exploit consumers' tendency to commit to sunk cost.57
Once a consumer spends time in choosing a product, spends
money in renting it, and becomes familiar with (or even attached
to) its characteristics, there is a higher likelihood that the item will
eventually be purchased, even though it is offered for a supra-
competitive price. In these cases, the SFC terms that guarantee
periodic payments reinforce buyers' commitment to sunk cost.
55. Some sellers restrict, by indicating a specific timeframe, the scope of
rental payments that can be applied towards purchase. A common term will
note, for instance, that the consumer "can apply all rental payments in the first
90 days towards ownership."
56. See, e.g., State of Wisconsin, Department of Financial Institutions,
Brochures: Rent-to-Own, http://www.wdfi.org/ymm/brochures/credit/rent-to_
own.htm (last visited July 8, 2007) ("Purchasing merchandise from a rent-to-
own company usually costs two to five times as much as purchasing the
merchandise from a department or appliance store. If the difference between the
total payments and the fair market value of the product was expressed as an
interest rate, the rate is commonly over 100%, and at times over 300%.").
57. These deals also exploit the Western consumer culture, where over-
consumption and instant gratification are the norm. For relating behavioral
failures to consumer culture, see infra notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
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Against this background, it is worthwhile to consider the well-
known case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.58 In this
famous case the court addressed the conscionability of a
repossession clause in an installment SFC. The contractual
provisions at issue purported to lease the purchased items to
appellant for monthly payments. The contract provided that
ownership would remain with Walker-Thomas until the total of all
payments reached the stated value of the item, and that in the event
of default Walker-Thomas could repossess the item. A cross-
collateral clause stated that "all payments now and hereafter made
by [purchaser] shall be credited pro rata on all outstanding leases,
bills, and accounts due to Company by [purchaser] at the time each
such payment is made." 59 In other words, in case the buyer rents
more than one item, the retailer holds the title of all products until
all items, whenever purchased, are fully paid for.
60
Much ink has been spilt over this case, but its behavioral facets
have been often overlooked. By constructing their transactions as
monthly payments and exploiting the sunk cost effect, Walker-
Thomas increased plaintiffs' commitment to continue renting the
items until all payments were made and ownership obtained.
Moreover, incorporating the cross-collateral term expanded this
commitment to the newer items on which nothing had yet been
spent by the purchaser. This might be one of the reasons that led
the court to express sympathy with Williams, despite her
questionable legal claims.
2. Unilateral Modification Terms
Many sellers draft contractual terms that allow them wide
discretion in changing and amending pre-drafted provisions.
Invoking the low-ball technique, sellers might draft standardized
clauses that enable them to change the SFC in a way that shifts
58. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
59. Id. at 447.
60. The court explained that, due to this term, "the debt incurred at the time
of purchase of each item was secured by the right to repossess all the items
previously purchased by the same purchaser, and each new item purchased
automatically became subject to a security interest arising out of the previous
dealings." Id.
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risks from one contracting party to the other. Consider, for
example, the following modification term which is commonly
found in consumer contracts:
[The seller] may change, add or delete these Terms and
Conditions of Use or any portion thereof from time to time
in its sole discretion. [The seller] will provide you with
reasonable notice of any changes. Thereafter, you [The
Buyer/User] expressly agree to be bound by any such
amended Terms and Conditions of Use.
6 1
In certain fields of commerce, such as the credit card industry,
guaranteeing the ability to change SFC terms unilaterally by using
such modification clauses has become a standard business
62practice. 62 In light of people's tendency to comply with a later,
less-favorable condition, sellers might employ this discretion and
change their agreements in a self-serving manner even when the
new terms are socially inefficient.
Thus, sellers who use this technique might induce consumers to
agree, more easily, to the modified less-favorable new set of SFC
61. This specific example was taken from Camcorder HQ, Camcorders:
Terms of Use, http://www.digitalcamera-hq.con/camcorder/info/terms-of-
use.html (last visited July 8, 2007). Similar pre-drafted contractual terms appear
in many other websites' standardized agreements. See, e.g., TripAdvisor.com,
Terms and Conditions of Use, http://www.tripadvisor.com/pages/terms.html
(last visited July 8, 2007).
62. For example, Chase accompanies their Chase Visa Platinum offer with a
term that reads:
You understand that the terms of your account, including the APRs, are
subject to change . . . . We reserve the right to change the terms
(including the APRs) for any reason, in addition to APR increases that
may occur for failure to comply with the terms of our account. Any
changes will be in accordance with your Cardmember Agreement.
(emphasis added). Similarly, Elite Rewards Platinum Plus MasterCard Credit
Card accompany their credit card offer with a detailed set of terms and
conditions, which include a statement that reads, "Account and Agreement are
not guaranteed for any period of time; all terms including the APRs and fees,
may change in accordance with the Agreement and applicable law." See also
John J.A. Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 285, 323 (2000).
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terms.63 Because of the low-ball technique, sellers who change
contract clauses by making them less beneficial to consumers will
not encounter such strong resistance as they would have were such
terms introduced in the first place.
64
To summarize this part, the sunk cost effect, cognitive
dissonance theory, confirmation bias, and low-ball technique can
be related to SFCs in three major ways: First, they explain
consumers' unwillingness to read the SFCs they sign or otherwise
enter. Second, they undermine consumers' ability to evaluate
objectively and optimally -the terms of which they are aware.
Third, these phenomena have an important role in drafting specific
SFC terms---such as periodic payments and unilateral
modifications clauses-as they provide sellers with additional
incentives to manipulate consumers.
III. DISTORTION AND MISPERCEPTION OF CONTRACTUAL RISKS
Contract terms allocate risks among contracting parties.
According to the conventional expected-utility-theory, a rational
individual should evaluate an action in terms of the level of
welfare it produces, evaluate uncertain outcomes according to their
expected value, and calculate outcomes, probabilities, and values by
optimally using available information.6 5 Put simply, contracting
parties are expected to base their judgments on an accurate
assessment of the risks involved. Hence, if we expect contracting
parties to behave rationally, we must, as a prerequisite, assume
rational risk perception. Accordingly, consumers who are
63. To the extent that a unilateral change clause is drafted with the intention
of making a delayed change, other doctrines aimed at deterring insincere
contracting, such as promissory fraud liability, may be invoked. Cf Ayres &
Klass, supra note 50 (arguing that breach of contract is not a necessary
component of promissory fraud).
64. Note, however, that firms incorporate such modification terms in their
pre-drafted agreements in order to maintain maximum flexibility and to allow
better responsiveness to changing circumstances. Nevertheless, the argument
here is that this technique also allows firms to degrade SFC terms and make
them socially undesired in a more "elegant" yet not fully appreciated way.
65. See Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive
Psychology for Risk Regulation, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra
note 16, at 325, 327-28.
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misinformed about the risks the contract allocates are actually
misinformed about the product itself.
66
Whereas standard economic analysis assumes that people have
clear and stable risk preferences, empirical evidence supports a
contrary assumption. According to this contrary presumption, risk
preferences and perceptions are often inconsistent and mistaken.
Since evaluating risks is a demanding and challenging cognitive
task, most people employ heuristics in the process of risk
evaluation.67  Thus, cognitive theory proposes a wide array of
important insights as to the actual way people make decisions
when facing risks and uncertainties.
68
This part argues that some of these insights are particularly
relevant to SFCs. The underlying assertion to be articulated at the
outset is that the way that people evaluate risks in real world
settings may result in a systematic distortion of the perception of
risks. The simple application of this idea to our context is that
such a distortion has an inevitably harmful effect on consumers'
ability to properly evaluate risk-allocation terms frequently
incorporated into SFCs.
69
Broadly speaking, misperception of risk is typically due to two
kinds of mistakes. First, individuals may err in evaluating the
prospects of a specific hazard (e.g., getting incorrect the statistical
danger of smoking). Second, people might have the accurate
66. Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, 44 REv. ECON. STUD. 561,
561 (1977) ("To be misinformed about the probabilities of product failure, is to
be misinformed about the product.")
67. See, e.g., Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 43, at 450 and
accompanying notes.
68. See generally HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 12; JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds.,
1982).
69. As was noted in Part I, cognitive theory aspires to demonstrate not only
that such heuristics exist, but also how they can be documented and modeled.
This part focuses on documented biases that past experiences and competitive
markets are not likely to correct, and proposes that some kind of policy or legal
intervention might be inescapable. For a discussion of policy implication in the
context of misperception of low-probability, high-consequence risks, see, for
example, Colin F. Camerer & Howard Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low
Probability Events: Policy Implications, 8 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS AND MGMT. 565
(1989).
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statistical information but nevertheless react in a sub-optimal way
(e.g., ignoring the danger of smoking even while being aware of
the relevant statistical facts). Sections A and B correlate with the
first source of mistakes; sections C and D deal with the latter.
A. Low-Probability Risks
The work of cognitive psychologists supports the assertion that
people encounter serious difficulties in assessing low-probability
risks.70 This difficulty is frequently manifested in underestimation
of risks.71 Moreover, unless made salient, low-probability risks are
even likely to be ignored.72 For instance, individuals tend to
ignore low-probability risks by refraining from purchasing
insurance, even when its purchase is highly subsidized.7
This part argues that people's difficulty in assessing low-
probability risks may have an important role in consumers'
misperception of SFCs and the risk they allocate. As Eisenberg
notes, "most preprinted terms are nonperformance terms that relate
to the future and concern low-probability risks." 74 Those terms are
seldom made salient. Contract clauses that deal with liability and
warranty, conflict of laws, default in payments, and mandatory
arbitration are some common examples of usually non-salient
70. For a discussion of low-probability, high-consequence events, see, for
example, Howard Kunreuther, Nathan Novemsky & Daniel Kahneman, Making
Low Probabilities Useful, 3, 5 (1990), http://grace.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/
downloads/01-17-HK.pdf (referring to previous research which demonstrates
that "many people are not able to meaningfully use probability information in
these contexts [of low probability high consequence events]" and stating more
generally that "many studies find that people have difficulty interpreting low
probabilities").
71. Cf Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of
Contract, 47 STAN. L. REv. 211, 222 (1995) and accompanying notes.
72. It should be noted, however, that underestimation (or complete
disregard) of risk is not the only possible approach towards low-probability
risks. There is also the possibility, under some circumstances, that such risks
will be overestimated. This can happen when dealing with personal injury risks
or where people cannot avoid risk confrontation. See, e.g., id. at 223-24 and
accompanying notes.
73. See, e.g., Camerer & Kunreuther, supra note 69, at 570 (referring to two
confirming studies).
74. See Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 240.
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standardized contractual clauses that allocate risks among
contracting parties and address future low-probability
contingencies.
Two of the reasons that lead people to ignore low-probability
risks are relevant to note here. One reason is to satisfy humans'
natural inclination to eliminate uncertainties. 75  Consequently,
consumers might ignore some contractual risks due to this
preference. Another possible explanation is that people often
employ and design relatively simple models in order to assure
easier communication and a simpler decision making process.
Ignoring low-probability risks, therefore, allows people to simplify
the decisions they face.
A common strategy for creating simplistic decision making
models is by attributing a high importance to the probability level
of risks while ignoring other aspects of the risks involved. It is
reasoned that where probability is perceived to be the critical
dimension in decision making, if a given probability is below a
threshold level, people will often refrain from taking any action.
76
Another common simplifying strategy is to focus on possible
outcomes of a given risk and compare them to a threshold. Where
the worst case scenario of the risk at stake does not reach the
threshold, people are not likely to take the necessary precautions.77
Thus, consumers might opt to devalue risks integrated in SFC
terms since in many casual and daily transactions the probabilities
that those terms address, and their potential outcomes, might not
meet a certain threshold. Moreover, many everyday SFC
transactions include goods and services which are neither
expensive nor dangerous. This implies that the relevant worst case
scenario will probably not involve a personal injury and will
usually not meet the necessary threshold to induce alertness and
precaution taking.
The end point of this observation is that all of these possible
explanations as to consumers' hardship in evaluating low-
probability risks establish a greater need to relax the assumption of
rational risk perception by consumers. This, in turn, might suggest
75. See Langevoort, supra note 10, at 1504.
76. See, e.g., Camerer & Kunreuther, supra note 69, at 570, 580.
77. Id.
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that, at least under some circumstances, the law should better
protect consumers who face contractual terms that address low-
probability non-salient risks.78
B. Availability Cascades
One cause that can make low-probability risks patent is
availability, which is a factor of both observed frequency and
salience. 79 In this context, the availability cascades suggest that
"people tend to think that risks are more serious when an incident
is readily called to mind or 'available.' 80 At the same time, this
bias also predicts that people tend to underestimate or ignore risks
that are not "available."
81
Availability has a direct effect on consumers in many fields of
commerce and in various decision making situations. Going back
to the example of insurance, for instance, it appears that flood
insurance is purchased mainly by individuals who have
experienced flood damage in the past or by people who are
78. This concern raises the fundamental tension between respecting
individual choices (including irrational ones) on one hand, and governmental
interference in the private sphere in order to promote efficiency (or other values)
where market forces do not reach an optimal equilibrium on the other. For a
discussion of product liability as a response to consumer misperception of risks,
see Spence, supra note 66. For behavioral law and economics writings that
address paternalism from various perspectives and plausibly argue that at times
paternalism is warranted, inevitable or even desired, see generally Colin
Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the
Case of "Asymmetric Paternalism ", 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1211 (2003) (arguing in
favor of asymmetric paternalism, which creates large benefits for those who
make errors while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully "rational");
Rachlinski, supra note 18; Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian
Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1159, 1187-88 (2003)
(articulating the idea that paternalism is inevitable while explaining why
libertarian paternalism is both possible and legitimate).
79. See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 17, at 1519.
80. Sunstein, supra note 20, at 5.
81. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 68, at 13 ("[T]he risk
involved in an undertaking may be grossly underestimated if some possible
dangers are either difficult to conceive of, or simply do not come to mind.").
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familiar with others who have had such experiences. 82 Similarly,
media reports about dramatic death causes-such as fire and
homicide-lead people to believe, erroneously, that some causes of
death are much more frequent than they really are.83 Operative
consumption decisions, such as getting smoke detectors (with
respect to the risk of fire), or purchasing weapons for self-defense
(with respect to the risk of being a victim of crime) are likely to be
among the typical responses that many individuals make due (at
least in part) to the availability cascades.
Since it is easy to remember conspicuous occurrences, people
tend to attach more weight to low-probability events once they can
easily imagine or otherwise generate similar or correlating
examples. As a result, people overestimate the low-probability
though "special" or salient events (that are likely to come into
mind), while underestimating the "regular" or non-salient ones
(which do not occupy much of their thought and attention).
With this background in mind we can better realize why
consumers are likely to ignore or underestimate the risks they
regularly take upon themselves when entering SFCs. Since people
tend to underestimate the "regular," non-salient, frequent risks,
consumers are likely to devalue risks that SFCs allocate to
consumers. Those (many) consumers who have not experienced
past disputes over standardized contract terms might not have
"available" occurrences capable of engendering better alertness.
There is another reason that leads consumers not to easily
recall past occurrences with respect to SFC terms. Many
consumers mistakenly do not attribute previous discrepancies to
contractual terms. It seems that there are many instances where
disputes over contractual terms and conditions are viewed by
consumers in the abstract, without realizing that the genuine source
of such disputes is a standardized contractual provision.
82. See, e.g., Herbert Simon, Rationality in Psychology and Economics, 59
J. Bus. S209, S215-16 (1986).
83. See, e.g., Camerer & Kunreuther, supra note 69, at 569 (referring to a
study that demonstrates that "[pl]eople perceive the likelihood of deaths from
highly reported disasters such as fires and homicide to be higher than those of
events such as diabetes and breast cancer. But the two diseases together actually
take twice as many lives as the two more dramatic events.").
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Perhaps an example will clarify. Many travelers focus on price
terms and thus shop for the lowest fare price they can find. In
most cases, the agreements that accompany lowest fare price
quotes restrict the purchaser from changing his travel dates.
Consumers who buy a relatively cheap ticket and later find it hard
or expensive to change their trip dates are not likely to fully realize
that the problem is created by an SFC provision that allocates risk
among the contracting parties. It is thus common to hear those
disappointed consumers complaining about the carrier's "strict
policy," "lack of flexibility," "unfairness," "lack of understanding,"
"lousy customer service," "unreasonableness," and so on. It is quite
rare for those aggrieved customers to associate the problem with a
standardized term they supposedly agreed upon when purchasing
the ticket.
Moreover, whether or not an event or a risk will become salient
depends greatly on the way in which influential groups-such as
the media, interest groups, and politicians-handle and treat
possible events and potential risks.84 These groups can control and
manipulate public concerns, attention, and opinions.
85
Accordingly, the fact that important social actors (such as the
media and politicians) are uninterested in the problems that
consumer contracts generate (and at times might even have
conflicting interests) 86 contributes to the fact that the risks that are
84. See, e.g., Kunreuther et al., supra note 70, at 2 ("Disasters, such as the
explosion at the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India in 1984, have sensitized
the public to the potential dangers from chemical facilities even though the
likelihood of such accidents is extremely small. This concern with the impact of
major accidental chemical releases can be illustrated by congressional passage
of the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) of 1990.").
85. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999).
86. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, The Over-Consumption Myth and Other
Tales of Economics, Law, and Morality, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1485, 1507 (2004)
(arguing that the myth of over-consumption serves high interest credit card
issuers and sub-prime mortgage lenders, and noting that "[i]f millions of
Americans believed that families were losing their homes and they were left to
cope with repo agents and aggressive bill collectors because they have been
fleeced by deceptive marketing and oppressive contract terms, then the
regulations that support billions of dollars of profits in the consumer credit
industry could be easily changed" (emphasis added)).
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usually allocated via SFC clauses are not made salient to most
consumers.
C. Self Serving Biases
As noted above, 87 risk misperception owing to an error in risk
assessment is only one important aspect in potential misperception
of consumer contract terms. People may have accurate and
adequate information with reference to a given risk but
nevertheless under-react to it.
Various reasons lead consumers to under-react to contractual
risks. As for an example, they might be willing to face certain
risks due to an unrealistic belief in their immunity from harm (i.e.,
the "it cannot happen to me" attitude). 88 Self-serving biases, such
as overoptimism and overconfidence, capture this course of
thinking.
People are unrealistically optimistic with respect to many
important aspects of their lives. The vast majority of people
"believe that their own risk of a negative outcome is far lower than
the average person's."89 Most people believe they are less likely
than others to suffer from automobile accidents, heart attacks,
smoking diseases, and other health risks. 90 Similarly, people often
display an unrealistic optimism or overconfidence concerning their
general ability, skills, and personal as well as professional
success.
91
87. See supra text following note 69.
88. Sunstein, for example, uses this insight to support "a form of anti-anti-
paternalism." Sunstein, supra note 20, at 3 ("If people are unrealistically
optimistic, they may run risks because of a factually false belief in their own
relative immunity from harm, even if they are fully aware of the statistical facts.
And if people's choices are based on incorrect judgments about their experience
after choice, there is reason to question whether respect for choices, rooted in
those incorrect judgments, is a good way to promote utility or welfare.").
89. Jolls et al., supra note 17, at 1541.
90. See, e.g., Neil Weinstein, Optimistic Biases About Personal Risks, 246
SCI. 1232 (1989).
91. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship
Is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of
Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1993).
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Being optimistic is generally a positive human trait.92  As
Langevoort explains, "[e]xcessive optimism and an illusion of
control over the future . . . may be seen as mechanisms to relieve
stress and anxiety and produce more aggressive, persistent
behavior (thereby leading to greater success)." 93 While there are
good, understandable grounds for self-serving biases, if people
systematically believe that they are relatively risk-free, then policy
concerns might be justified.
In the context of consumer contracts, overoptimism can be an
important factor in a consumer's decision to waive his or her legal
rights (e.g., the right to launch litigation) or to undertake some
legal risks (e.g., waiving seller's legal responsibility for his own
negligence). If consumers were able to objectively evaluate their
risk exposure, they would probably be more careful before
accepting such contractual clauses and more reluctant to be legally
bound by them.
The problem of over-optimism becomes even more acute when
considering the overconfidence bias. This bias suggests, inter alia,
that people tend to overestimate their ability to predict outcomes.9 a
Thus, unrealistic optimism, especially when combined with
overconfidence, posits a serious challenge to the assumption that
consumers as a class are able to properly evaluate and efficiently
respond to the risks that SFC terms allocate.95
Furthermore, probability judgments interact with, and are
influenced by, the desirability of potential outcomes. For instance,
people tend to ignore or degrade prospects of future unpleasant
situations, such as car accidents or property destruction due to an
earthquake, even when they obtain accurate statistical information
92. See Rachlinski, supra note 18, at 1172 (noting a strong correlation
between self-serving biases and well-being, and pointing out that "[o]nly those
who suffer from clinical depression ... have realistic self perception").
93. Langevoort, supra note 10, at 1506.
94. See Rachlinski, supra note 18, at 1173 ("Over-confidence in one's own
judgment magnifies the undesirable consequences of erroneous judgment....
Excess confidence impedes individuals' ability to learn from mistakes and
improve their ability to make better decisions.").
95. Compare Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 43, at 454 (linking over-
optimism to voluntary acts and stating that "[b]ecause consumers voluntarily
enter into contracts, they will tend to believe that they can also sagely discount
the low-probability events covered by standard terms").
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regarding such specific hazards. At times, also, people tend to
avoid confronting unpleasant information.96  Therefore, people
might refrain from obtaining information with relation to some
risks due to the negative nature of the potential knowledge and
what it may imply.
9 7
Obviously, SFCs typically contain clauses that refer to future
unpleasant situations. Contractual terms that address payment
defaults and legal disputes are prominent examples. Therefore, the
general tendency toward ignoring (or heavily discount) unpleasant
prospective contingencies can further distort consumers' risk
perception with respect to SFC terms that deal with such
disagreeable circumstances.
A specific example can help further clarify this point. Recall
for a moment the case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co., where the purchaser agreed that all payments shall be credited
pro rata on all outstanding leases, bills, and accounts. 98  Even
assuming that the buyer is equipped with the proper education and
mental capacity necessary to understand the meaning of such a
term, overoptimism might prevent him from fully appreciating the
risks he faces by adhering to it. One's evaluation of default in
payment is directly related to one's success and wealth, especially
when we keep in mind that self-serving biases correlate with the
desirability of prospective outcomes. The application of these
behavioral biases to the Williams case suggests that the purchaser
might have been susceptible to overoptimism in its strongest
form.
99
96. See source cited supra note 38 and accompanying text for the discussion
regarding cognitive dissonance.
97. For an argument that people also tend to over-estimate the chances of
what they perceive to be a positive occurrence, such as winning the lottery see,
for example, Camerer & Kunreuther, supra note 69, at 578.
98. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 447 (D.C.
Cir. 1965); supra note 60 and accompanying text.
99. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1373, 1432
(2004) (suggesting that underestimation due to the optimism bias might have
affected Williams' ability to understand the relevant provision: "Due to the
underestimation bias, Williams may have been insufficiently sensitive to the
inclusion of the repossession clause"; and opining that "arguably, the seller
designed the installment purchase contract to exploit buyers' behavioral biases
.... Williams was lured in by the attractive purchase price, only to face later the
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This analysis emphasizes the complex interaction between the
different (yet related) failures discussed in this part. Clearly, the
combination of these failures can raise serious concerns. Many
contract clauses, especially those that govern possible legal
conflicts or payment defaults, are vulnerable to different and
various failures at the same time. Such terms address low-
probability risks; they deal with unpleasant potential situations;
they are likely to be discounted due to self-serving biases; and they
do not enjoy a high degree of public attention or salience, which
makes them even less likely to become available.
D. Consumption Culture
Finally, people are inclined to discount future risks and
rewards, employing a bias toward current spending and
consumption while discounting or ignoring deferred satisfaction.1
00
Closely related, people are "impatient about the near future and
myopic about the distant future."' 0' For example, it is widely
agreed that American families nowadays spend more and save
less. 102
These general consumption practices make the issue of SFC
risk perception even more problematic. Consumers might not take
the necessary precautions when facing a future risk incorporated in
an SFC they face due to a present-consumption ideology or
threat of repossession."); see also Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 241-42 (noting
that from a seller's perspective, consumers' over-optimism and overconfidence
can justify incorporation of harsh protective terms, anticipating the need for a
strong form of security, but that on the other hand, sellers take advantage of
these biases by tempting buyers to enter into deals beyond their financial
ability).
100. Langevoort, supra note 10, at 1505.
101. Camerer & Kunreuther, supra note 69, at 579.
102. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 86, at 1489 and accompanying figures 3-
6. Although Warren believes that over-consumption is a myth, she surveys data
that supports the statement that "families are not just spending more of what
they earn, they are also spending what they have not earned. Over the space of a
single generation, American families have transformed from a nation of savers
to a nation of spenders." Id. at 1489.
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preference.10 3  This phenomenon deserves a more thorough
examination, analyzing its relation not only to risk perception but
also to the more general idea of consumers' bounded will power
and the proper ways for policy makers to respond. 104  For our
purposes here, however, suffice it to note that the stronger the
consumption culture and ideology, the more likely it is that
laypeople will not fully acknowledge the risks they face by
accepting SFC terms.'
0 5
To conclude this part of risk perception and evaluation, general
cognitive failures distort the ways in which consumers evaluate
SFC terms and the risks they present. As a result, individuals may
have difficulties in pricing contractual provisions. This aspect is
probably in one of its most acute forms in the context of consumer
contracts. Whereas trained or sophisticated contracting parties
might have the incentive, ability, and opportunity to learn to
correct some of these cognitive biases and mistakes, most
consumers, as unsophisticated one-shot players, are unlikely to
gain this kind of experience and expertise.
103. See Camerer & Kunreuther, supra note 69, at 573 (noting that in
research conducted in Pennsylvania and New York, more than 70% of motorists
participating in a survey said they would not purchase an automatic seat belt that
cost $100 if this would decrease their annual insurance premium by $25; and
reasoning that the drivers' reluctance could be attributed, inter alia, to high
discounting of future benefits).
104. For such an analysis of how bounded will-power and the over-optimism
bias may undermine consumers' rationality, see Bar-Gill, supra note 99, at
1432.
105. By using the term "consumption culture and ideology," I refer to the
urge to consume and to the cultural importance that people commonly attribute
to consumption. As noted, one might argue that this reflects, at least in part,
bounded will power. I believe that the two bounds are interrelated here. Strong
consumption habits and ideology might undermine one's ability to approach
and evaluate transactions in a "rational" way. Cf Bar-Gill, supra note 99, at
1400 ("Of course, the optimism explanation and the imperfect willpower
explanation... reinforce one another.").
106. The implicit assumption here is that repeating an experience can help
individuals to correct or minimize at least some cognitive mistakes. However,
there is a serious debate over whether facing repeated decision tasks provides
people with the adequate feedback to improve their ability to avoid cognitive
biases and thus improve the quality of their decisions. Compare, e.g.,
Langevoort, supra note 10, at 1521 (presenting a relatively skeptical view), with
Rachlinski, supra note 15, at 757 (presenting a somewhat more optimistic view
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IV. EMOTIONAL STRESS AND CONSUMER HARASSMENT
Pressure and stress 10 7  might disrupt optimal decision
making. 10 8 When individuals encounter a sufficiently high degree
of stress, they are likely to fail to optimally consider their options
and actions.1 09 This is not to say, however, that pressure and stress
will inevitably degrade decision quality. Quite to the contrary,
people need some degree of stress in order to behave optimally
when making decisions. A moderate amount of stress can be
constructive for efficient decision making.''
0
This part seeks to explore how the surroundings and settings of
some typical SFC transactions influence consumers' decision
making. The first section of this part provides the general
theoretical background necessary for understanding the arguments
made thereafter. In the second and third sections I apply the
relevant insights to offline and online consumer transactions
governed by SFCs.
that "feedback is a pre-requisite for learning" but conceding that "novices in a
field or one-shot players are unlikely to have had enough experience to have
received adequate feedback"). Obviously, different biases require different
debiasing techniques, and the success rate and efficiency of each technique vary
substantially.
107. As employed by psychologists, the term "stress" is used to describe
unpleasant emotional states that result from threatening environmental events.
See generally IRVING LAW JANIS & LEON MANN, DECISION MAKING: A
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT 50
(1977).
108. See id. at 45 ("[P]eople are likely to regret in leisure the impulsive
decisions they make in haste while undergoing emotional turmoil.").
109. See, e.g., Peter Wright, The Harassed Decision-Maker: Time Pressure,
Distraction, and the Use of Evidence, 59 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 555, 560 (1974)
(exploring the affect of noise and time pressure on individuals' tendency of
"becoming extremely alert to discrediting evidence on a few salient
dimensions").
110. See JANIS & MANN, supra note 107, at 62 (specifying four conditions
for vigilant decision-making).
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A. The Theoretical Background
To describe the various reactions that people are likely to
display when encountering decisions that involve different levels
of stress, psychologists have developed the conflict model. " This
model proposes some interesting predictions, three of which I find
to be relevant to our discussion of consumer SFCs.
First, the conflict model predicts that where the decisionmaker
suspects she does not have the necessary time to gather and
analyze the important information she would otherwise like to
obtain, high pressure can lead to "hypervigilance," where
individuals are likely to choose the most readily available option.
Second, the model suggests that where a decision has to be
made within a short timeframe (i.e., the decision cannot be
postponed) and the decisionmaker doubts his ability to improve his
decision by obtaining additional information, a high degree of
stress can lead to "bolstering"; where, again, the decisionmaker
will choose the most available alternative.
Third, the conflict model predicts that where people think that
the decision they face is not a risky one, they will have a weaker
incentive to pursue information. As a result, people in no-stress
situations tend to be more passive and to invest less efforts in
gathering information and reaching optimal decisions.
B. Consumer Contracts Settings
Generally speaking, the legal literature that deals with
consumer transactions via SFCs does not invoke the terminology
of the conflict model and its predictions. Yet, the observation that
consumers find themselves entering transactions or signing SFCs
under stress and pressure is not a novel one, as it has been applied
previously in a few, limited contexts.
A very common context that demonstrates the need to protect
consumers who enter transactions under unfavorable conditions
and stress is that of the door-to-door sale. Generally speaking, a
door-to-door sale (which is sometimes referred to as a "home
solicitation transaction") occurs whenever a consumer is being
111. Id. at45-134.
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solicited to purchase goods or services at a private residence (or in
a place other than the regular seller's business site).
Recall that according to the conflict model, people who decide
under time constraints (common in door-to-door sales) tend to
choose the most available option. When it comes to door-to-door
transactions, time pressure, emotional manipulation, the inability to
consider other alternatives, and, at times, the desire to get rid of the
salesperson, may all result in a situation where the most available
option for the consumer would be to enter the transaction and
purchase the offered product."1
2
And indeed, it has been widely acknowledged by a variety of
legislatures that in typical door-to-door transactions, many
consumers might not reach optimal decisions because of time
limits and emotional stress. 1 3  Accordingly, many states have
enacted statutes allowing consumers a "cooling off' period after
entering transactions in which they are not likely to have had
adequate time for reflection. During these "cooling off" periods,
consumers are permitted to cancel door-to-door sales contracts."i
4
Another significant example of the need to protect consumers
from entering transactions under unfavorable emotional conditions
arises in the context of home purchases, which calls to mind the
second prediction of the conflict model. Purchasing a home, which
is considered, in general, to be the most important transaction that
most individuals make during their lifetime, 115 can generate a
considerable amount of stress. In an early application of the
112. See generally Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 78, at 1187-88 (attributing
successful door-to-door transactions to consumers' bounded rationality and
bounded will-power).
113. See, e.g., Texas Attorney General, The Consumer Protection Door-to-
Door Brochure, http://www.oag.state.tx.us/AGPublications/txts/door.shtml
(last visited Sept. 17, 2007) ("Be suspicious of anyone who tries to sell by
playing on your emotions. For example, some sellers will suggest you are
shirking your responsibilities to your family if you don't buy their product.").
114. See, e.g., Door-to-Door Sales Protection Act, N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§
425-31 (2007); see also 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (2007) (in which the Federal Trade
Commission imposes a mandatory three days cooling-off period as well).
115. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 86, at 1495-99 (opining that a home
purchase is not only "the single most important purchase for the average middle-
class family" but that home prices are the most dominant factors that lead
American families to substantial financial difficulties).
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conflict model to home sales law, Eskridge argues that: "the high
stakes and the overwhelming complexity of the [home purchase]
transaction will paralyze many homebuyers' desire to shop for the
best deal .... The complex factors involved discourage all but the
most confident and knowledgeable shopper from a thorough
search."'"16
Recall that according to the second prediction of the conflict
model, if the decisionmaker doubts his ability to improve his
decision by obtaining additional information, he will choose the
most available alternative. As Eskridge explains, this insight
might underscore a need for protecting consumers in the context of
house sales.
In this part, I assert that the predictions proposed by the
conflict model and other experiments documenting the results of
unfavorable conditions on decision making should be extended to
consumer SFCs much more broadly. In many cases, the
surroundings that accompany SFC transactions can seriously
undermine consumers' aptitude to make optimal decisions.
Clearly, and as will be detailed next, the combination of stress,
pressure, and emotional manipulation is quite unique (though not
exclusive) to the SFC offer and acceptance. In most other
contractual relationships-especially those that involve two firms
(or two individuals) that contract with one another, such dynamics
are not expected to repeatedly play a crucial role. The next
paragraphs attempt to provide a more thorough analysis of this
issue.
1. Time Limit and Noise Distraction
At times, courts have acknowledged that consumers may enter
SFCs under unfavorable conditions. Broadly speaking, when
dealing with consumers' claims of emotional stress, courts have
frequently invoked the notion of "contract of adhesion," the
"reasonable expectation" principle, or the unconscionability
116. William N. Eskridge, One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for
Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of
the Home Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083, 1116 (1984).
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doctrine. " 7 Nevertheless, courts lack a systematic vision of why,
how, and when stress is a relevant factor in consumer contracts
cases. The examination below seeks to fill some of this gap.
As the conflict model and other empirical experiments suggest,
time limits are key factors that might create stress in decision
making. Many SFCs are likely to be signed under time pressure.
Some of the everyday examples that may illustrate this typical
situation are transactions involving car rentals, parking lots, theater
tickets, dry cleaning services, and so on.
118
Consumers are often rushed by sellers to sign SFCs without
reading them first and without being allowed sufficient time for
careful deliberation." 9  Moreover, evaluating form contracts
requires considerable time and mental investment since those
contracts typically incorporate many terms 120 and use legal jargon
extensively. The combination of time pressure on one hand, and
the amount of time necessary for carefully reading an SFC on the
other, minimizes the chances that consumers will end up reading
the standardized terms to which they adhere.
Whereas time constraint is one important factor that can yield a
negative effect on consumers' attitude toward SFCs, the possibility
of a noisy environment and loud distractions is another key aspect.
On many occasions consumers are asked to enter contracts in a
noisy setting, while there are other customers waiting for service.
This is tackled next.
117. See, e.g., Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013
(Ariz. 1992) (invoking the notion of "adhesion contract" and the "reasonable
expectations" principle).
118. Cf Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 242 ("[F]orm takers often encounter
form contracts under circumstances that encourage the form taker to exert only
minimal effort to understand the preprinted form. Few hurried travelers, for
example, will pause to read the boilerplate provisions of their car rental
agreements.").
119. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 43, at 448 ("Businesses often
present standard-form contracts at a moment when consumers are hurried and
when stopping to read and understand the boilerplate will feel awkward or
unpleasant .... ).
120. See generally Claire A. Hill & Christopher King, How Do German
Contracts Do as Much with Fewer Words, 79 CHI-KENT L. REv. 889 (2004)
(arguing that American contracts are particularly long and detailing possible
reasons for this phenomenon).
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2. Other Consumers and Seller's Attitudes
From a consumer's perspective, the attitude exhibited by other
buyers might aggravate the situation. It is not uncommon to see
other customers display nervousness (or even impatience) toward
those exceptional buyers who insist on reading the SFC they enter
or on bargaining over the pre-drafted terms. 1  Naturally, most
consumers would prefer avoiding these predicted responses by
quickly signing (or otherwise accepting) SFCs.
While other buyers' attitudes toward reading consumers is one
notable feature in creating unfavorable conditions, sellers' attitudes
toward them is another important source of stress. Everyday
experience teaches us that many sellers tend to demonstrate
(sometimes explicitly) their uneasiness with consumers' request to
read, let alone negotiate or change, SFCs. As is shown next,
sellers' discomfort toward reading consumers can be explained in
various ways.
One plausible explanation for sellers' uneasiness toward
consumers who ask to read or change SFCs is sellers' tendency to
view such requests as an expression of distrust.' 22 Since trust is an
important dimension in our everyday interactions, acts that display
distrust are likely to encounter negative reactions. Buyers,
therefore, are expected not to read SFCs in order to refrain from
generating antagonism as well as to maintain their own self-
perception of trust, conformity, and cooperation. Crafty sellers
who are aware of this natural human trait might exploit it.
This is not the only plausible rationalization for seller's
impatience toward reading consumers. Interestingly, a seller's
impatience can also be attributed to his own anxiety. A seller
might fear that reading consumers, as a class, are likely to be
sophisticated buyers. Those buyers, it can be anticipated, are more
likely to reveal assertiveness or aggressiveness in the course of
their commercial interaction. From a seller's perspective,
121. I will use the term "reading consumers" when referring to this group of
consumers.
122. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 43, at 448 ("Consumers will feel
uncomfortable suddenly indicating distrust to the reassuring agent by studying
terms covering unlikely events.").
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generally speaking, it would be a natural response to avoid this
type of buyer, or at least to display nervousness toward them.
It is also important to recall that SFCs are usually presented by
sellers' agents who have only limited (if any) legal expertise. In
most cases, those corporate agents are not trained to address legal
problems and concerns. Hence, salespeople may fear that reading
consumers will raise questions that are beyond the scope of their
knowledge. Furthermore, sellers' agents typically lack the power
to change the substance of the contracts they offer to potential
clients. 12 3 In this respect, facing one's own lack of knowledge or
authority is likely to generate uncomfortable feelings. Since most
people would prefer to avoid such feelings, sellers' understandably
form-whether consciously or not-a negative attitude toward
reading consumers.
Thus, businesses establish the contracting environment in a
way that leads consumers to believe that reading form contracts is
actually wasting others' time. 124 Where sellers associate reading
consumers with a highly likelihood of wasted time, they will also
associate them, as an inevitable result, with loss of potential
revenues. Those buyers who pay attention to standardized terms
are likely to consume more time in the process of shopping and
negotiating. 125
Moreover, reading consumers might as well hamper sellers'
efforts to create a commerce-friendly atmosphere. Arguing over
preprinted terms is costly for sellers not only intrinsically, but also
in the form of lost sales. Disputing contract terms may create a
general atmosphere of confrontation. This, in turn, can negatively
affect other customers' willingness to interact with the business
123. See, e.g., Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract:
Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 600 (1990);
Daniel T. Ostas, Postmodern Economic Analysis of Law: Extending the
Pragmatic Visions of Richard A. Posner, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 193, 227 (1998) ("If
the consumer has questions on a contractual term [in a form contract], the
corporate agent, perhaps a relatively untrained salesperson, may not understand
the language nor have the power to alter it.").
124. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 43, at 448 ("At the very least, the
business's agent may send signals that he is in a hurry.").
125. As noted, this is perceived to be a waste of time, especially since sellers'
agents are usually not authorized to dicker over standardized terms. See
generally, e.g., Ostas, supra note 123.
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and its representatives, since other consumers might become more
suspicious and reluctant to enter the contract at stake. Hence, by
voicing concerns with respect to contractual provisions, reading
consumers decrease the prospects that new customers will enter an
SFC, and, as a result, increase sellers' overall transaction costs.
The physical proximity between buyers and sellers is an
additional point that ought to be acknowledged in listing the
potential sources of stress and pressure from consumers'
perspective. In many cases, physical proximity between buyers
and sellers can make it even harder on consumers to calmly
consider their acts and carefully deliberate the contracts they face.
This is so since people need a minimum degree of isolation or
private space for making level-headed decisions. It can be an
unpleasant experience for a buyer to read an SFC while the form
giver is (literally) closely looking at her, inspecting her reactions,
and at times displaying impatience. This further exposes buyers to
possible emotional manipulation by sellers.
Clearly, many different factors interact in causing buyers stress
and pressure. The various factors that can lead consumers to
experience stress and pressure make it important to discuss the
predictive value of the conflict model and the related literature that
deal with time pressure and other sorts of potential distractions.
This is especially important, since people have diverse
characteristics and different ways of coping with stress and
pressure. Thus, it is impossible to accurately predict the level of
stress that consumers are likely to encounter in every individual
case (and, likewise, the amount of stress that any given consumer
will experience).
Nevertheless, some vital insights can be derived as the set of
observations described in this section is likely to be true for
consumers as a class (that is, notwithstanding one's character and
preferences). As an extreme example, it is fairly straightforward
that regardless of one's personality, the sense of stress and pressure
that accompanies a home sale transaction is not to be compared
with the one experienced when purchasing sporting event tickets at
the stadium box-office. And neither should be compared with
entering a contract with a local dry-cleaning service for cleaning
one's clothes.
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Therefore, the importance that people attribute to their decision
and the amount of stress and pressure they are likely to encounter
are dictated by numerous factors. In this context, the observation
that entering a home sale contract creates much more stress than
entering a dry-cleaning contract should not be understood as
suggesting that the amount of stress is dictated only by (and is in
correlation only with) the amount of money which is at issue.
Financial commitment is merely one factor (though it is obviously
an important one). Renting a car in a foreign airport, for example,
might be a very stressful experience---disproportionate to the
amount of money involved.
Thus, the degree of stress that consumers face when entering a
contract varies substantially from one case to the other. The time
spent while waiting in line, the salesperson's attitude, the number
of people in line, the general environment where the transaction
takes place, and other context-dependent aspects (such as the
amount of money involved) are just some of the features that
determine the amount of stress and pressure that consumers might
experience when accepting an SFC.
Despite this relative indeterminacy, the bottom line should be
clear: Under unfavorable conditions and emotional stress, which
ordinarily accompany many of our everyday consumer
transactions, people typically make their decisions less carefully.
Stress, pressure, and consumer harassment can lead people to enter
SFCs without ample consideration. Under such conditions
consumers are less inclined to read the contracts they enter. This
provides a possible reason as to why the act of entering a form
contract should not be automatically considered a manifestation of
consumers' optimal deliberation and utility maximization. In
many cases, the default assumption should be quite to the contrary.
C. Online Consumer Transactions
While different types of transactions result in different levels of
stress, it is argued that some contractual settings do not create even
a minimal sense of emotional discomfort and excitement. "Rolling
contracts" (where consumers receive the full contract only with the
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merchandise) 126 and online ("clickwrap" and "browsewrap")
agreements are typical transactions where one might plausibly
argue that the act of contracting via SFCs entails no stress and
involves no inherent environmental disadvantages. In such cases,
generally speaking, consumers are free from the burden of
communicating with the other party.
Hillman and Rachlinski suggest that, "[e]-consumers can shop
in the privacy of their homes, where they can make careful
decisions with fewer time constraints. They can leave their
computers and return before completing their transactions, giving
them time to think and investigate further."' 127 Accordingly, one
might argue that the virtual e-commerce environment provides a
better alternative to real world transactions insofar as stress and
time constraints are issues. The e-commerce setting does not
involve any interaction with manipulative sellers; other buyers are
not part of the regular shopping experience; noisy environment is
not an intrinsic part of electronic contracting; and time pressure
does not exist in most cases. At least on the face of it, consumers
in electronic standard form contracting do not encounter the hostile
pressure and stressful conditions that sometimes exist in real world
contracting.
This assertion in favor of the e-commerce contracting
environment can be criticized from two very different perspectives.
First, it can be argued that, in some other respects, the features of
internet contracting might increase stress, rather than alleviate it.
Being able to communicate with salesmen (and people in general)
has some important positive attributes. For instance, in a real
world transaction the presence of a seller makes the other
contracting party visible. In addition, real world sellers can
reassure consumers that the contract they are entering is a
126. See source cited supra note 36 and accompanying text.
127. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 43, at 478; see also id at 480
("Indeed, perhaps the most obvious difference between electronic and paper
contracting is that, in the paper world, salespeople usually deal with consumers
face to face, whereas electronic consumers transact business from the privacy of
their homes or offices. All of the social factors that deter consumers from
reading standard terms depend upon the influence of live social situation that
electronic contracting lacks. E-businesses cannot easily duplicate the effects of
an endearing, but manipulative, agent in the electronic format.").
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reasonable one. Regardless of the accuracy of such a claim, that
might help diminish consumers' anxiety. Last, the fact that other
consumers are interacting with the business might serve for the
individual consumer as a signal of reasonableness, thus providing
some kind of collective relief.
By contrast, when it comes to e-commerce contracting,
consumers might be on alert because of other features of the
internet setting. When entering SFCs online, consumers might
experience anxiety due to privacy concerns, fear of identity theft,
uncertainty as to whom they are contracting with, as well as
uncertainty as to when and how the transaction is to be concluded.
Moreover, an online consumer might feel some sense of
discomfort since he is left to his own devices, without fellow
consumers with whom to discuss the transaction at hand.
Second, even if we accept the premise that e-contracting might,
under proper circumstances, reduce the stress and lessen many of
the unfavorable conditions created by human interaction in regular
circumstances, it is yet necessary to consider the third prediction
proposed by the conflict model. Recall, that this prediction
suggests that no risks and no stress can actually undermine optimal
behavior and decision making. In consequence, those e-commerce
circumstances which do not involve stress might result in sub-
optimal information gathering with regard to that SFC for the very
reason that it does not give rise to a stressful situation. 128 This is
perhaps especially true if by the time that the online consumer has
reached the stage where she enters a contract, she has already
exhausted most of her patience and cognitive ability (which were
used in order to reach the decision to purchase the specific item or
service). 129
128. This argument against e-commerce invites strong opposition. As
before, one general objection is the one of anti-paternalism. Yet there is a strong
intuition that a distinction should be drawn between protecting consumers from
pressure and stress caused by sellers (who can manipulate consumers and profit
from their mistakes), and protecting consumers from their own indifference
arising from common behavioral patterns. Although this concern accompanies
much of this Article's analysis, the "no pressure" argument raises strong doubts
that should be carefully considered.
129. See source cited supra note 36 and accompanying text (relating this
reality to the problem of sunk cost and cognitive dissonance); see also Eskridge,
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Though this argument must be taken seriously, it should not be
taken too far. At this point one might wonder whether this
allegation against the e-commerce environment does not make it
almost impossible to attach a rational assent to consumers'
decision to enter almost any SFC. If we adopt the premise that
stress, as well as lack of it, can be harmful for deliberate decision
making, it might then be natural to question under what
circumstances consumers are not in a need of vigorous protection.
However, this is not an accurate understanding of what the
argument contends. Many consumer decisions create some level
of stress, excitement, or alertness. Concerns are justified only in
those exceptional cases that involve excessive stress or nearly
absolute lack of it. Thus, the assertion that some of the
circumstances surrounding e-commerce diminish the minimum
sense of alertness (necessary for an optimal decision making)
should be carefully established.
The argument that e-commerce environments may over-relax
consumers to the point that they should not be presumed to behave
rationally becomes more plausible once we consider some of the
distinct features of e-commerce. I will give particular attention, in
this regard, to the fact that consumers usually need not sign their
names in order to enter online transactions.
Contracting parties can signal their acceptance of a contract's
substance to one another in various ways.130 One prominent way is
by signature. There are many different types of legally binding
signatures,131 and some do not require ink and paper.
supra note 116, at 1116 (making a similar argument to explain why home buyers
are less inclined to shop for mortgage loans and related expenses).
130. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-206 cmt. 1 (Supp. 2006) (adopting a similar
approach and rejecting technical rules of acceptance); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 30(2) (Supp. 2007) ("Unless otherwise indicated ... an offer
invites acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the
circumstances.").
131. See, e.g., Mark Lewis, Digital Signatures: Meeting the Traditional
Requirements Electronically: A Canadian Perspective, 2 ASPER REV. INT'L Bus.
& TRADE L. 63, 66 (2002) ("Canadian and American courts have held that
signatures include names on telegrams, telexes, typewritten names, letterheads,
and faxed signatures." (footnotes omitted)).
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Nevertheless, most people perceive a regular (ink) signature to be
the most solid, binding, and powerful technique of contract
acceptance. 133 Thus, in most cases contracting parties sign their
agreements in order to validate them and convey a signal of legal
obligation.
Clearly, a consumer's signature on a contract is a powerful,
legally binding act. 134  Signing a contract is probably the most
common mode of contractual acceptance, especially among
ordinary consumers and laypeople.135 A personal signature, using
paper and ink, is a form of personal symbol. 136 Accordingly, from
the consumer's perspective, signing a contract can be an act that
generates some sense of awareness or importance.'
37
Yet, and contrary to most real world transactions, e-commerce
does not generally require consumers to sign their name or type
their initials when entering a contract.' 38 Entering a contact on the
132. See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(39) (Supp. 2006) (defines the term "Signed" as
to include "any symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention to
authenticate a writing").
133. See, e.g., Anthony M. Balloon, From Wax Seals to Hypertext:
Electronic Signatures, Contract Formation, and a New Model for Consumer
Protection in Internet Transactions, 50 EMORY L.J. 905, 934 (2001) ("That a
signature is the central formality in contract formation-particularly in a
consumer transaction-cannot be overstated. Most consumers equate their
signature with being bound to the terms of an agreement." (footnotes omitted)).
134. See, e.g., Peter Meijes Tiersma, The Language of Offer and Acceptance:
Speech Acts and the Question of Intent, 74 CAL. L. REv. 189, 206 (1986) (noting
that there are various ways to accept a contractual offer, and that, inter alia, "[a]
party can accept an offer by affixing a signature to the contract").
135. This becomes even more evident when we recall that SFCs, which
account for the vast majority of modem contracts, frequently require consumers'
signatures.
136. See Balloon, supra note 133, at 934.
137. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 43, at 480-81.
138. The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act §
106(5) defines "electronic signature" to include an "electronic sound, symbol, or
process, attached to or logically associated with a contract or other record and
executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record." The
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act § 2(8), 7A pt. 1 defines "electronic
signature" as an "electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically
associated with a record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to
sign the record." See generally Julian Epstein, Cleaning Up a Mess on the Web:
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web is fairly easy: In most cases, all the consumers have to do is
double-click ("I agree" or "I accept"). In many cases, rolling down
the screen where the terms are detailed or opening the relevant link
where the contractual clauses are specified is not a pre-requisite for
entering a contract by clicking "I agree."' 139  Often, there is no
explicit clarification that clicking "I agree" forms a legally binding
contract. 14 Moreover, in some cases the web-page default is set to
the "I agree" link, making it even easier for consumers to enter the
online contract. 
14 1
As a result, consumers in the electronic commerce reality are
less likely to attribute importance to merely clicking "I agree"'
' 42
and thus are less likely to realize they have just entered a legally-
binding contract. This assertion can be slightly restated by
invoking the prediction laid out by the conflict model: Where no
signature is required, consumers are likely to lack the minimum
sensation of stress or excitement necessary to induce careful
A Comparison of Federal and State Digital Signature Law, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL'Y 491 (2002) (analyzing the intersection between the two approaches
to electronic signature). See also Balloon, supra note 133, at 933, who argues
that this reality justifies some kind of reform. Balloon proposes that "[t]o make
contract formation a more deliberate process, the law should require consumers
to type their initials into boxes on the web page next to certain terms in the
contract." Id. He assumes this can function, inter alia, as a method that "makes
contracting more intentional," since "[i]nitialing makes consumers stop and
think about what they are agreeing to, instead of the typical scenario in which a
consumer haphazardly clicks buttons and links to complete the contracting
process in the quickest manner possible." Id.
139. Cf id. at 932 ("On the Internet, the terms of an agreement can be placed
anywhere, with only an inconspicuous link alluding to the presence of the
terms. . . . The law should not allow the terms of a contract to be so easily
hidden.").
140. See id. at 935 ("[N]ew legislation should be passed that requires
disclosure to a consumer that clicking a button on the Internet is legally
equivalent to signing a name in a writing.").
141. Furthermore, some websites require the consumer to click a "continue"
button in order to acquire the relevant service or merchant, without providing
the consumer with any other alternative (aside from withdrawing the transaction
at stake), and while noting that "[b]y clicking the Continue button you agree to
the License Agreements and Privacy Policies for the software included." For
one such example, see http://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/readstep2.html.
142. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 43, at 481.
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shopping and information analysis. This means, in sum, that e-
commerce consumers may enter SFCs without realizing the legal
significance of their actions.1
43
The topic of electronic signature and e-commerce has been
approached from a variety of perspectives, and much more should
be said about it.144 For the purpose of the analysis presented here,
however, suffice it to say that simple and traditional methods can
minimize the chances that consumers will enter e-commerce
contracts without fully realizing the scope of commitment they
take upon themselves when doing so. Requesting consumers to
sign their names or initials when entering e-contracts (or
mimicking real world signature in other ways) is one key factor
that might alleviate some of this problem. Slightly modifying the
e-commerce contractual setting in some other minor respects might
be worthwhile as well. 1
45
In summary, many typical consumer contracts are entered
under unfavorable conditions and involve stressful surroundings.
By the same token, other common transactions are entered in a
very casual setting, where no stress is involved. This part argues
that decisions made under either circumstance are typically made
less cautiously. Excessive stress and pressure, or complete lack of
it, can seriously undermine optimal contracting behavior and
decision making.
Yet the analysis presented here should not be understood as
suggesting that the law should invalidate or ban transactions that
143. One might plausibly argue that this is mainly a transitional matter and
that as times progress consumers will learn to better understand the new reality.
This optimistic view has merit, but the transitional period might be long and the
problems during this period can be substantially mitigated only if we pay close
attention to them. Moreover, even if consumers will end up realizing the new
reality, it might still be difficult for them to internalize its significance when
sellers construct the contracting process in a way that does not generate
alertness.
144. For a more complete yet very different analysis of online consumer
SFCs, see Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine2.0:
Standard Form Contracting in the Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008) (focusing on the legal
significance of the ex post-ex ante information flows that the online realm
provides).
145. See supra notes 138-142 and accompanying text.
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are entered under unfavorable conditions and emotional stress or
those entered under no stress at all. This would be too far-
reaching, inefficient, and destructive. Moreover, this is not to
imply that modem consumer and contract law should consider
irrelevant the fundamental principle of holding consumers
accountable for their own decisions. Rather, the analysis of this
part emphasizes the importance of contractual environment and its
potential effect on the way consumers think, behave, and make
decisions.
Unfortunately, courts and policymakers frequently fail to
acknowledge this aspect of contract formation and its significance.
At times, they over-rely on rational consumers and free market
forces. The analysis here puts forward an additional reason why,
under some circumstances, consumers' rationality with respect to
the acceptance of SFCs should be carefully examined.
Most states within the United States have acknowledged some
of these problems and have taken steps to better protect consumers.
This has been done, for instance, with reference to door-to-door
sales. Yet, door-to-door transactions are only one scenario in
which consumers are exposed to sales tactics that involve
emotional stress and manipulation and result in sub-optimal
decision making. Consumers are still left without adequate
protection in many other cases governed by SFCs.
V. INFORMATION OVERLOAD
The inherent hardship involved in evaluating contractual risks
discussed above 146 becomes even more troubling once we consider
consumers' tendency to focus solely on certain salient aspects of
the transactions they enter. Typically, consumers focus their
attention only on a limited number of patent attributes (most
notably price, quality, appearance, and function) while ignoring
most other characteristics.
This part deals with this phenomenon. Section A briefly
details the basic relevant aspects of information search and
disclosure theory. Thereafter, section B examines recent data and
experiments as to consumer decision making strategies when
146. See supra Part III.
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
facing excessive information. It further considers the specific
harms that excessive information can pose to consumers.
A. Information Search and Disclosure
A rational decisionmaker who seeks to maximize her utility is
assumed to search for information up to the point where the search
costs exceed the expected value of the information not yet
revealed. 147  Undoubtedly, providing information is crucial for
reaching optimal decisions and minimizing the negative effects of
asymmetric information.
Yet two main allegations against information disclosure
concerning consumers' bounded rationality should be noted here.
First, as a general assertion, cognitive errors influence human
choice in a way that "undermines the benefits of information
disclosure," since, if "individuals make bad choices even when
they have good information, then information disclosures and
warnings are useless."'148  Second, behavioral analysis suggests
that, in many decisional contexts, the slogan "the more the better"
is completely invalid. 49  Moreover, under some circumstances
excessive information might have negative consequences. 50  As
explained below, this is especially true in the context of consumer
SFCs.
147. This is the traditional theory of consumer search behavior. See, e.g.,
GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 2 (4th ed. 1987).
148. Rachlinski, supra note 18, at 1177 (footnote omitted).
149. See, e.g., Charles E. Davis & Elizabeth B. Davis, Information Load and
Consistency of Decisions, 79 PSYCHOL. REP. 279, 279 (1996) ("While there may
be a belief that 'more is better,' decision-makers often complain of 'information
overload' or an inability to respond to the abundance of information available.").
150. This has been acknowledged by many legal institutions, including the
U.S. Supreme Court. See, e.g., Ford Motors Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S.
555, 568 (1980) ("Meaningful disclosure does not mean more disclosure.
Rather, it describes a balance between 'competing considerations of complete
disclosure... and the need to avoid [informational overload]."' (quoting S. REP.
No. 96-73, at 3 (1979)).
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B. Information Processing and Consumer Contracts
Empirical studies demonstrate the assertion that people indeed
encounter cognitive problems that can undermine their ability to
process information accurately and efficiently. The general
argument in this respect is that it is an impossible task to consider,
absorb, and compare all the relevant data necessary for reaching an
"informed" and "rational" decision in many consumer markets.
Because human memory and cognitive abilities are not infinite,
consumers cannot analyze and absorb all of a product's attributes.
Behavioral science scholars have been exploring and disputing
the relevance of information overload and its influence on
consumers' ability to shop efficiently by accumulating and
processing information.151  The term "information overload" is
generally used to acknowledge that people exhibit limited
processing capacity and can become overwhelmed by a deluge of
information or choices.'
52
Two main arguments follow this straightforward observation.
First, consumers are likely to consider only a limited number of
aspects with regard to any given transaction while ignoring other
characteristics that are not made salient. Whereas it is widely
agreed that market pressure can ensure efficiency with relation to
those products' attributes that are being shopped and compared
(i.e., salient), sellers are expected to engage in a race-to-the-bottom
with respect to other attributes that are frequently ignored by
consumers. 53 As will be explained below, most of the terms that
are typically incorporated into SFCs are not likely to be among
those patent attributes that sellers compete over.
151. See generally Byung-Kwan Lee, The Effect of Information Overload on
Consumer Choice Quality: The Moderating Role of Product Knowledge (2001),
http://www.ciadvertising.org/student-account/fall_0 1/adv392/bklee/paper2/hom
e.htm ("[U]p until now, information load studies have not produced unequivocal
results. Some researchers found its presence but others did not." (quote found in
"General Discussion" section; follow "General Discussion" hyperlink)).
152. See, e.g., David M. Grether, Alan Schwartz, & Louis L. Wilde, The
Irrelevance of Information Overload. An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59
S. CAL. L. REv. 277, 278 (1986) (using a similar definition merely as a starting
point).
153. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
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Second, it is not only that consumers are expected to consider a
limited array of attributes, but that too much information can harm
consumers in different ways and lead them to ignore important
information they would have chosen to consider were they not
overwhelmed by its excess. I now elaborate on these two
arguments.
1. Information Overload and Consumer Contracts
Since people cannot absorb and efficiently analyze all available
information, they are compelled to satisfice, rather than to
maximize or optimize.' 54 That consumers are not likely to utilize
all relevant information included in SFCs can be further illustrated
by referring to Korobkin's argument. 1
55
Making optimal consumption decisions requires consideration
and evaluation of all relevant contract terms. Theoretically, in
order to compare different products with different attributes, a
consumer ought to employ what is known as the "weighted adding
strategy."' 56 Under this strategy, a consumer (as a decisionmaker)
is supposed to assign a weight to every potential product attribute
she wishes to compare. Important features receive relatively high
weight while less significant attributes are given less weight. In
the next stage, the consumer presumably scores each product
characteristic. Finally, the decisionmaker multiplies the weight
and the given score, then adds all factors for one total score. This
score will represent the product's overall quality from consumer's
viewpoint. Therefore, a consumer who seeks to maximize utility
chooses the product that received the highest total score.
154. The distinction between optimizing and satisficing is a fundamental
distinction which is applied frequently in many contexts: Whereas "to optimize"
means to choose the best option available, "to satisfice" means to choose a
satisfactory option considering the circumstances.
155. See generally Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form
Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203 (2003).
156. This strategy is discussed in many different decision-making contexts.
See id. at 1220; see also, e.g., James R. Bettman, Mary Frances Luce & John W.
Payne, Constructive Consumer Choice Processes, 25 J. CONSUMER REs. 187
(1998) (applying this strategy in the context of consumers).
157. For those who find the idea behind the weighted adding strategy a subtle
one, a concrete numerical example is provided next. Assume, for example, that
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Obviously, employing such a strategy requires time, information,
mental ability, and mental attention. As the scope of relevant
information increases, it becomes more difficult to reach a truly
informed, rational (and thus efficient) decision.158
Whereas it is true that the weighted adding strategy maximizes
utility and promises sufficient incentives for sellers to provide
efficient SFCs, consumers are not likely to follow this decision
making method in real life.159 As decision making becomes more
and more complicated, 60 consumers will try to find shortcuts that
a buyer seeks to purchase an automobile. At the first stage, the buyer identifies
the characteristics she wishes to compare. Let's assume that there are only five
features she values (and thus compares): safety, financing, warranty,
maintenance expenses, and the cost of insurance. At the next stage, every factor
is given a weight, according to its relative importance. For example, safety
scores 40%; financing---20%; warranty--20%; maintenance expenses-10%;
and cost of insurance-10% (reaching 100% in total). At the next stage, the
buyer scores each attribute of every product being compared and multiplies it
with the attribute's weight. Implementing this method with one car can result in
the following evaluation (assuming each characteristic will be graded on a 1 to
100 point scale): Safety receives a complete satisfaction score of 100-the final
score for this attribute is 40% x 100 = 40; financing receives a relatively high
degree of satisfaction score of 80-its final attribute score is 20% x 80 = 16;
warranty receives an average satisfaction score of 50--its final attribute score is
20% x 50 = 10; maintenance receives an above average satisfaction score of
70-its final attribute score is 10% x 70 = 7; and insurance expenses receives a
score of 60 and a final attribute score of 10% x 60 = 6. It follows, then, that this
specific car will get a total score of 40 + 16 + 10 + 7 + 6 = 79. This application,
however, referred to only one car. After repeating the process for all cars that
are being compared, the rational decisionmaker chooses the one that got the
highest overall score.
158. See Korobkin, supra note 155, at 1226-29 (discussing complexity and
selectivity).
159. See id. at 1223-25; see also, e.g., Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 43,
at 435-45.
160. In the modem era, it is believed that most products and services that are
accompanied by form contracts "are characterized by a relatively large number
of attributes concerning functionality, aesthetics, cost, and terms." Korobkin,
supra note 154, at 1229.
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will enable them to reach satisfactory decisions without coping
with all available information. 161
These fundamental observations entail that, in the process of
satisficing, consumers ignore non-salient products attributes.'
62
Korobkin's key point is that SFC terms are among those attributes
that are likely to be overlooked by consumers. This important
prediction relies on the factual premise that "relative to other
product attributes, form terms . . . usual content makes them
unlikely to attract buyers' voluntary or involuntary attention.'
1 63
This reality, in turn, creates a market failure that results from
sellers' race-to-the-bottom since it provides contract drafters with a
profit incentive to include low quality (non-salient) terms in their
pre-drafted forms.
164
Korobkin focuses on the effect of information overload in the
context of relevant yet excessive information. In so doing, he
mainly considers other products' attributes in addition to what can
be found in form contracts. Yet, as Eisenberg explains,
information overload makes form terms likely to be non-salient not
only because of the amount of general information that can be
found with respect to any given product, 165 but also because many
161. For a brief review of a few practical and prominent consumer choice
strategies that fall below the accuracy that a weighted adding strategy offers, see,
for example, id. at 1223-25; see also Bettman et al., supra note 156, at 190-92.
162. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 154, at 1225.
163. Id. at 1226. Korobkin defends this premise id. at 1231 (referring to
terms that "are likely to cause elevated stress levels for buyers"); at 1232
(discussing terms that "govern eventualities that are extremely unlikely to
occur" making it hard for decisionmakers to calculate properly); and at 1233
(noting that form terms are often presented "in ways that make them hard to
read, hard to understand, and hard to compare ....").
164. See, e.g., Bar-Gill, supra note 99, at 1376 (arguing that this is the case
in credit card contracts and noting that "if the credit card market is indeed as
competitive as it appears to be, issuers have to exploit consumers' imperfect
rationality in order to survive in this market"); Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 244
("Indeed, competition is likely to degrade the quality of preprinted terms [e.g., in
the context of a bank agreement]. Once some banks offer low-quality preprinted
terms, competition will force other banks to include the same low-quality terms
in their form contracts, so as not to be undercut on activity charges and interest
rates. This is a special case of the market-for-lemons phenomenon.").
165. I here refer to information that is relevant to the product but does not
directly involve the SFC itself (e.g., shape, color, consumer reports, etc.).
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terms incorporated into SFCs are irrelevant and unnecessary. As
will be explained next, encountering irrelevant, dense text within
SFCs can lead to non-salience, just as encountering too much
(relevant) information outside of the contract can.
2. Further Hazards of Information Overload
One of the first references to the problem of information
overload arguably unsolved by traditional legal means arose with
reference to consumer credit transactions.' 66 In this respect it was
argued that due to information disclosure requirements consumers
are exposed to too much information that can overwhelm them.
Later on, the debate became more general and inclusive in its
proposed analysis.
One main approach toward information overload was
expressed by Grether, Schwartz, and Wilde.' 67 In their seminal
article, Grether et al. confront the question whether information
disclosure can harm consumers through information overload.
168
They acknowledge that information overload can theoretically
harm consumers in three different ways. They nevertheless argue
that information overload is basically irrelevant in competitive
markets.
First, Grether et al. address the possibility that information
disclosure can cause confusion. This theoretical fear is that some
consumers may "inadvertently or erroneously devote time to
observing this [irrelevant] attribute that they would have devoted
to observing the things that do concern them, and thereby make the
wrong decision.'' 69 They dismiss this argument, noting that there
166. See generally Jeffery Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure
and Gobbledygook: An Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer-
Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REv. 841 (1977).
167. Grether et al., supra note 152.
168. Grether et al. explicitly claim that their analysis is extendable to
consumer contracts. Id. at 281 n.7 ("The text speaks mainly of search for
products because the literature discusses products, but its analysis extends to
contract terms. A contract can be regarded as another product attribute or as a
product that has several attributes (i.e., different terms).").
169. Id. at 285.
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is no evidence supporting the assertion that consumers cannot
efficiently ignore irrelevant information.
70
I find this line of reasoning quite problematic insofar as it is
applied to SFC terms. 171 Consumers who read form contracts can,
indeed, get confused due to what they find in print. Reading SFCs
requires legal understanding of many subtle issues. Although there
might be no empirical evidence supporting this doubt,
172
distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant contract terms is a
very demanding task. Therefore, consumers who attempt to
compare SFCs might indeed get confused by what they read and
devote valuable resources for obtaining information on issues that
are not worth this investment. Clearly, focusing one's attention on
redundant information might undermine optimal decision making.
.Second, Grether et al. examine the argument that information
overload can harm consumers if the process of deciding which
information to ignore "will make consumers feel frustrated or
dissatisfied."' 173  They reject this allegation, reasoning that ideal
disclosure should increase consumer choice since it allows
consumers to observe a larger range of product's attributes.
According to this reasoning, ignoring (or not using) information
should not cause unhappiness to consumers.1 74  Moreover, they
reason, consumers are presumed to report more satisfaction with
purchase choices when they believe they have more information on
170. Id.
171. Interestingly, some scholars have pointed out that consumers indeed
find it' hard to distinguish between the different types of information, and that
this hardship might inflict harm on them. See Camerer et al., supra note 78, at
1235. A prominent example is the one of food labeling, such as "low-fat" or
"fat free." In this context it is argued that requiring retailers to display detailed
facts concerning food content "may have even contributed to the epidemic of
eating disorders in the United States." Id. (footnote omitted).
172. Generally speaking, empirical evidence tailored to the context of
consumer SFCs is rare, and there are only a few empirical studies on this
subject. For an exceptional example, see Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain,
Standard Form Contracts and Contracts Schemas: A Preliminary Investigation
of the Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers' Propensity to Sue, 15
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 83 (1997).
173. Grether et al., supra note 152, at 285.
174. Id. (reasoning that "lowering airfares to a place one does not want to go
should produce no emotion or the pleasant thought that if one's preference
change, one can satisfy the new preference more easily").
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which to base their decision, regardless of whether they actually
use the whole range of available information.' 
75
This explanation is a credible one in some consumer contexts,
but quite questionable in the context of SFCs. It is more than
reasonable to assume that exposure to SFC terms that one cannot
easily read and understand may indeed result in consumers'
frustration or dissatisfaction. Encountering information that one
cannot effectively analyze is certainly likely to result in some kind
of disturbance. Reading a text without being able to understand it
can definitely be emotionally frustrating. 1
76
There is another possible harm, grounded on the traditional
consumer search behavior theory that Grether et al. discuss in their
article. This third concern is that irrelevant information can be
destructive to consumers who seek certain information "if it raises
the costs to them of observing attributes in which they are
interested."' 177  Moreover, if the search cost associated with
observing desired attributes increases sufficiently, consumers
might even cease to detect these attributes. 178
Interestingly, Grether et al. reject this concern as well. First,
they find this danger inapplicable where simple products are
involved. Since simple products have few salient dimensions, and
since observing few important attributes is not a challenging task,
they opine that it is unlikely that consumers will find information
gathering to be too expensive or complicated. They argue that
when it comes to complex and expensive products consumers tend
to shop extensively. Thus, they reason, "the presence of some
state-required irrelevant information in connection with the sale of
these products should seldom cause consumers to truncate search
over attributes they care about."'' 79
175. Id. at 285 n.16 (referring to studies that support this claim).
176. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Comments: Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L.
REv. 305, 309 (1986).
177. Grether et al., supra note 152, at 286.
178. Id. (noting that in such a case information disclosure will produce a
market failure, rather than cure it).
179. Id. Moreover, they argue, decisionmakers should limit disclosure
requirements to attributes with which a substantial number of consumers are
concerned, thus reducing the average search costs. Id.
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Though this argument may be valid in some contexts of
information disclosure, SFCs are different. When dealing with
such contracts, it seems doubtful that the "extensively shopping"
rationale is a compelling one. There are various justifications that
lead consumers not to shop (let alone shop extensively) among
different SFCs. Among these reasons are the increased costs
imposed on the consumers due to the incorporation of irrelevant or
unimportant contract terms. 18 0 As a result, even if consumers still
opt to shop for information, the existence of irrelevant information
is likely to make this search more expensive and thus, at times, less
likely to occur.
Information gathering and information disclosure are important
components in mitigating the problem of asymmetric information
in consumer contracts. Nonetheless, information and disclosure
duties are not panaceas. This part demonstrates why, and under
what circumstances, information per se cannot guarantee optimal
or efficient consumer behavior and decision making in the context
of SFCs.
As explained, buyers are likely to find it hard (i.e., expensive in
terms of mental efforts and time) to distinguish between relevant
and irrelevant information which form contracts contain. This
hardship can harm consumers, since they may get confused by
superfluous information and mistakenly pay attention to it (instead
of paying attention to the important information necessary for
making informed decisions). Devoting resources to gather and
analyze non-essential information might result in erroneous
decision making. Another problem with excessive information is
that it might cause emotional frustration and dissatisfaction to
consumers. This is especially true since consumers are not
equipped with the necessary expertise to understand form contract
clauses. Last but not least, redundant information raises
consumers' search costs. Where the increased costs are
sufficiently high, incorporation of unnecessary information might
encourage consumers to opt not to read form contracts.
Moreover, even if consumers are able to easily and cheaply
locate the relevant information without encountering emotional
frustration, they are likely to display sub-optimal evaluation of
180. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 243.
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such information. Employing an optimal decision making
approach as required by expected utility models (such as the
weighted adding strategy) is an extremely demanding task.
Limited human capacity and information overload compel
consumers to satisfice, and thus to ignore some aspects of the
transactions they enter. Among these non-patent attributes likely
to be ignored by consumers are SFC terms.
If buyers do not read SFC terms and thus do not obtain
accurate information as to the substance of their contracts, market
forces will drive sellers to offer only low-quality contract clauses.
Engaging in a race-to-the-bottom with relation to non-salient
contract terms allows sellers to compete over salient attributes,
most prominently on price. 181  This provides an additional
explanation as to why consumers alone are incompetent to drive
the market of SFC terms to equilibrium where efficient contracts
are being drafted.
CONCLUSION
The interdisciplinarism in the field of SFCs (as in the case of
contract law in general) is dominated by law and economics
scholarship. The importance of traditional law and economics
analysis of SFC is evident, but some of its analysis and
presumptions should not be left unchallenged.
In a recent article, Eric Posner questions the success of
economic analysis of contract law, both normatively and
descriptively. 182 As Posner asserts, one of the possible alternative
(or, to my mind, supplementary) methodologies to economic
analysis of contract law is a psychological approach.183  The
framework sketched in this Article undertakes the challenge of
181. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 154, at 1206 ("[M]arket competition
actually willforce sellers to provide low-quality non-salient attributes in order to
save costs that will be passed along to buyers in the form of lower prices.").
182. See generally Posner, supra note 10. Interestingly, Posner uses
consumer contracts and the doctrine of unconscionability as one example that
demonstrates the failure of economic analysis of law. Id. at 842-45.
183. Id at 872-73. Posner does not find this alternative persuasive,
specifically "in the face of the poor fit of cognitive psychology and the penalty
doctrine." Id. at 873.
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making this methodology more appealing and more feasible
insofar as consumer contracts are at issue.
The law and economics study of SFCs teaches us how
important it is to focus on the key aspects of transaction costs and
obligational asymmetric information. This Article seeks to
strengthen this analytical concept by employing behavioral
concepts. These concepts profoundly enrich our understanding as
to why obligational asymmetric information exists, what its
potential harmful consequences are, and how the law can better
address it.
Furthermore, behavioral insights demonstrate that people
sometimes make bad choices even where good information is
available. Given these circumstances, information disclosure
cannot ensure optimal decision making. In this sense, both the
neoclassical economic analysis of asymmetric information and the
behavioral analysis presented here attempt to provide criteria that
can successfully distinguish between consumption decisions that
consumers make due to true preferences and those that are a result
of some kind of mistake.
Although cognitive psychology has much to contribute to the
study of SFCs, it has been largely overlooked by lawyers, judges,
academics, and legislators. To be sure, there have been some
important attempts to bring cognitive psychology into the subjects
of consumer protection law and SFCs. Yet, these efforts do not
systematically encompass all relevant perspectives. This Article
attempts to fill some gaps between the social literature in the field
of decision making and its legal application to consumer contracts.
Current approaches of contract law fail to provide an adequate
solution to the problems that SFCs pose. Behavioral insights make
it clear that one of the main reasons for this failure is under-
appreciation of consumers' cognitive limitations and actual
behavioral patterns. Without acknowledging those patterns,
attempts to regulate form contracts and judicial control over them
can yield only partial solutions. For the law that governs SFCs to
deliver optimal results, it must be based on the most accurate and
up-to-date understanding of human behavior.
More specifically, this Article has discussed four groups of
behavioral patterns that might prevent consumers from reading and
efficiently evaluating SFCs, thus allowing sellers to manipulate
[Vol. 68
2007] BEHA VIORAL SCIENCE AND FORM CONTRACTS 179
consumers in various ways. The surroundings that accompany
many SFCs, the process and structure of standard form contracting,
the content of most SFCs, and the informational environment that
typically escort consumer contracts, all suggest important insights
that help to explain consumers' inability to maximize utility by
contracting via standardized agreements.
As to the contracting environments, emotional stress and the
unfavorable surrounding conditions accompany many form
contracts. Under such circumstances, decisions are likely to be
made less carefully. When it comes to the contracting process,
consumers are exposed to the sunk costs effect, cognitive
dissonance, confirmation bias, and low-ball technique. Previous
time and effort investment accompanied by perceptions of self-
commitment may prevent buyers from reading the contracts that
they enter or from rationally evaluating them.
Alas, consumers are disadvantaged not only with respect to the
surroundings and the process of standard form contracting, but also
with relation to the specific content of many SFCs. Cognitive
failures, such as the availability cascades, over-optimism, and
individuals' inability to correctly evaluate low-probability risks,
can result in distortion of risk perception. In turn, these
phenomena undermine consumers' ability to correctly price
contractual terms that allocate risks among contracting parties.
On top of it all, even if consumers were able to overcome these
hardships and biases, they are not likely to reach optimal decisions
due to the informational environment that typically accompanies
modem products. As explained, information overload might
undercut efficient contracting in various ways. Most significantly,
it raises the costs of information gathering and makes it less likely
that consumers will carefully read SFCs.
The importance of questioning consumers' rationality in the
context of SFC terms cannot be overstated. Cognitive errors
impede the idea that open market forces can achieve an efficient
and just equilibrium. Behavioral insights put forward a variety of
phenomena that make it easier on sellers to manipulate consumers.
Any general theory of and practical approach to consumer
contracts must take cognitive biases and actual behavioral patterns
into account. To do otherwise would be unconscionable.

